

# **REVOLUTIONARY IRAQ 1968 - 1973**

THE POLITICAL REPORT ADOPTED BY THE  
EIGHTH REGIONAL CONGRESS OF THE  
ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY-IRAQ.



THE ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY.  
— BAGHDAD

**January 1974**



**Revolutionary Iraq**  
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**The Political Report Adopted  
by the Eighth Regional  
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January 1974**

**OCTOBER 1974**



**Comrade Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr  
Secretary General of the Regional  
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# **REVOLUTIONARY IRAQ**

## **1968-1973**

THE EIGHTH REGIONAL CONGRESS OF THE ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY IN IRAQ WAS HELD IN BAGHDAD BETWEEN THE EIGHTH AND TWELFTH OF JANUARY 1974. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE POLITICAL REPORT ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AND DELIVERED BY COMRADE AHMAD HASSAN AL-BAKR , SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE REGIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY AND PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC.

DELIVERY TOOK PLACE ON THE 5TH, 6TH, 7TH OF MARCH 1974.





# INTRODUCTION

The Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party was held five years after the revolution launched by the Party between the 17th and the 30th of July 1968 in Iraq. The epoch has been one of democratic and progressive achievements. It has also been rich in experience relating to the handling of difficult, delicate and complicated problems such as the consolidation of the Party's rule and the Revolution's authority, and dealing with the execution of patriotic, democratic, socialist and other tasks of revolutionary transformation and struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

Our Congress therefore has been characterized by new special features differing from those of the Seventh Regional Congress of five years ago, which was held in Baghdad on the 24th of November 1968 right after the breakout of revolution and the assumption of power by the Party and before the enrichment of Party experience and the strengthening of the Revolution's arm.

Our Eighth Congress had to avoid generalities

in patterns which provide no concrete guide for work. It had to exert the greatest possible effort to formulate a realistic and clear revolutionary programme which would unify the will of the Party and the masses, leaving no room for possibly conflicting interpretations.

It should now be possible, after five and a half years at the helm of political power and acquaintance with the problems of revolutionary democratic and socialist transformation, to know exactly where we stand.

The Party, having passed through sensitive and sometimes even bitter experiences on both the regional and national levels, finds it incumbent to define what must and could be done over the next five years.

Inexperience can no longer be a justification for failure or an apology. The masses in our country and the Arab Homeland can no longer find any excuses of revolutionary inexperience for us and must now look to us as qualified leaders. In order to live up to expectations, we must re-evaluate the past phase starting from July 17th 1968 until now, in an objective, frank and revolutionary spirit.

We must be able to find out the positive as well

as the negative aspects and errors. Everything must come out to light now which may not have come to light so far because of the sensitive circumstances.

What in fact are the characteristics and peculiarities of the phase between 17-30 July 1968 and the congregation of this Congress? The problems and issues which faced the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the popular revolutionary movement during that phase?.

It's a well known fact that the Revolution of July 17th was not the first one in Iraq. Ten years earlier, the 14th of July 1958 Revolution took place and was basically progressive, democratic and inspired. In power, however, the revolutionary regime deviated and changed course into a dictatorial, rightist and regional mentality while keeping the outward signs of nationalism. A daring attempt was made by the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party on the 8th of February 1963 to re-establish a revolutionary, democratic and popular regime which would work for Arab Unity. The attempt, unfortunately, soon failed in achieving the objective.

It was during the black Novemberist [1963] regression, that the most backward rightist and dictatorial forces reached power. Never since July

14th 1958 had there been in authority people more inclined to make peace with imperialism and open for reactionary infiltration and opposition to democratic thought and progressive application. The net result was a grave threat of encirclement and compromise of the two revolutions of July 14th 1958 and February 8th 1963 and all their revolutionary gains and achievements. The progressive forces of the masses, the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party at the fore, were exposed to all sorts of terrorism and repression. The Revolution of July 17th 1968, aiming by nature at liberation, democracy, socialism and national integration, was beset by the failures of July 14th 1958 and February 8th 1963 and the special peculiarities of Iraq. It had to face, therefore, additional burdens, extremely complex and delicate. The errors and deviations of the preceding phase had engulfed all aspects of life with grave implications. So the Revolution had to deal with all of this while at the same time working for its immediate targets and strategic aims of Arab Unity, liberty and socialism.

The Revolution had to establish immediately revolutionary power and Party leadership and to realise the progressive and democratic tasks which the two previous revolutions failed to realise.

It had to carry out new tasks required by the

new phase of revolutionary development and ensure all possible prerequisites of socialist transformation while making an effective contribution to the Arab struggle against imperialist Zionist aggression and the ever increasing dangers of reactionary connivance in the Arab world.

These were the central preoccupations and problems facing the Party and the people on the state, national and international levels, during the past five and a half years. They had to meet the required conditions to face those tasks and to make all possible efforts to achieve the immediate targets and move hence forward toward realising the strategic aims of the Arab Revolution for unity, freedom and socialism.

In the following chapters of this report, the Regional leadership explains frankly, accurately and in detail, the circumstances and factors accompanying the progress of the Party and the Revolution during the past phase. It deals with the internal as well as the local, Arab and international conditions and their effects on the abilities of the Party and the people in facing the tasks and realising the objectives.

The past phase has had its ups and downs, triumphs and failures. It was rich with many achie-

vements and many essential gains. It was not, however, free from some negative aspects and partial failures.

We strongly feel, as we pass from one phase into another, that all things considered, the march of the Revolution has been one of success and triumph. Indeed, it has been able to pave a new course for the revolutionary movement in our country and in the Arab revolutionary movement. It has been able to lay the basic foundations for a revolutionary experiment which is popular, national, democratic, socialist and ideally suited for the Arab world and the Third World. Now as in future, it can play an ever increasing bright and prominent role in the Arab and international revolutionary movement. This is a part of what the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party has stood and struggled for during thirty years. The masses in our country and the Arab world made sacrifices and gave martyrs for it.

# **PART ONE**

## **THE PHASE EXTENDING FROM JULY 17TH 1968 TO JANUARY 1974**





**CHAPTER ONE**

**THE PARTY AND  
THE ASSUMPTION OF  
POLITICAL POWER**

# **SECTION ONE**

## **PARTY CONDITIONS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION OF JULY 17TH 1968**

The political state of the Party as, regards both size and quality, is determined by its own internal strength together, of course, with other external conditions. The internal strength of the Party, on the state and national levels, is measured by such determinants as the unity of thought, cohesion, extent of the organizational base and the quality of leadership on all levels. External considerations include the relationship of the Party to the masses, the measure of respect and confidence, the ability of the Party to mobilize and move the masses, the moral organizational strength of the Party through the ranks of the armed forces and the amount of goodwill and respect for the Party in the Arab and international circles. These are the basic considerations that have determined size and quality of the movement of the Party before and after the assumption of power and in the execution of revolutionary tasks when in power.

In order to form an objective estimation of the nature and size of the Party's political movement before and after the assumption of power on July 17th 1968, we must look into the state of the Party in Iraq and the Arab world between November 18th 1963\* and July 17th 1968.

The Party, during this period, suffered bitterly from schism on the regional and national levels and from the after effects of the previous political failures in Iraq and Syria. This was a problem to be reckoned with in addition to the permanent responsibilities of fighting Zionism, imperialism and reactionary dictatorial forces, while being subjected to all brands of repression in the Homeland.

On November 18th 1963, the Party's hegemony in Iraq failed causing a great disappointment to the Party and the masses in Iraq and the Arab world. The shock was tragic in spiritual terms, moral size, as well as in the loss of the revolutionary gains and the loss of many Party martyrs who fell while bravely fighting the regressive move.

A second blow was dealt to the Party in Syria two years and a few months later on the 23rd of February 1966 when the February clique in Syria

\* November 18th 1963 is the date of the reactionary military coup led by Abdul Salam Aref and other rightist and suspect elements against the Party's revolution of February 8th 1963 in

managed a military coup against the national authority of the Party as represented by the National Command. This set-back of February 23rd produced a totally new situation which was exceptionally dangerous and complex. A situation whereby the party was ruled by the force of arms under false pretences of ideology, organization and political principles. A grave vertical and horizontal split within the Party followed, producing situations of deep conflict and chaos. The psychological, organizational and political effects of such a split were particularly disturbing in Iraq.

The first schism took place after November 18th while Party members and adherents were in a painfully stifling situation, suffering from physical and mental terror. Campaigns of political slander were directed against them by the regime and many other political quarters while being daily subjected to criticism and reproach by the people for previous errors.

The majority of the leaders of the splinter group were former leaders and cadres of the Party in Iraq. They put all their weight behind winning over the rank and file of the Party in Iraq.

The Party in Iraq, however, started to gather strength, though under great stress, after the question of legitimacy was decisively settled in the 7th National Congress held in Damascus in Februa-

ry 1964. Party fighters started to blaze their future trail with a higher morale and greater confidence.

The Party found itself more cohesive than before, in spite of the large-scale repression by the Aref regime after the events of September 5th 1964 and the many consequent losses suffered by the Party. It felt, as did the masses also, that it could challenge the Aref regime on a large scale. New leaders on all levels, were being born after the experiences of November 18th and September 5th\*. Those leaders proved their worth by rallying the rank and file of the Party around them for the new drive. Hardly had the wounds of the first schism healed and the effects of the Aref campaign on September 5 been forgotten before the February 23rd walk-out on the Party in Syria came along. It was a hard blow. It came while a large section of the regional Party leaders in Iraq and a large number of the Party's members and supporters were in prison . Any new gains and achievements in matters of organization, thought and policy were again exposed to danger and chaos. The Party plunged again into whirlpools of internal splits and conflicts and remained so until

\* In September 1964 the Aref regime in Iraq conducted the most repressive campaign against the Party and its partisans in a desperate attempt to liquidate it. The campaign reached its peak on 4 - 5 September 1964, and thousands of fighters filled the prisons and gools.

an extraordinary regional congress was held in September 1966 when a new regional leadership was elected.

Organizational measures were adopted at this congress and later had the effect of isolating the February clique who formed by themselves another organization using falsely the name of the Party.

The widening breach in Iraq and the psychological and organizational effects that followed resulted in the loss of a considerable section of Party leaders, members and supporters. Some fell under the weight of despair or terror and others were swept away by the schisms into splinter groups.

The Party found itself under these circumstances in a very difficult and complex situation having to challenge the Aref regime while avoiding its blows to simultaneously fight the schismatics ideologically, organizationally and politically while trying to rebut their false accusations. The Party had to do all this while trying at the same time to mobilize the masses and regain their absolute trust and re-establish credibility.

The shortcomings of the Party regimes of February 8, 1963, in Iraq and March 8, 1963, in Syria were now all thrown on the shoulders of the Party. For the splinter groups soon washed their hands of the Party and became its worst enemies by levelling at it grave accusations. The public image of the

Party was tarnished and mistake-ridden.

The Februarists, on the other hand, manipulated the errors of the March experiment and the Party's negative relations with other parties and political forces. They started to claim to the masses that they represented merely a new and more progressive line in the Party!

The conflict between the Party and the February deserters was by no means equal. The Februarists were in power in Syria and they could use the government and regime for their ends, while the Party had no props other than the working masses and its poor fighters to face the harshest circumstances.

While the deserters were able to flood their organizations and the street with glossy pamphlets sponsored by official circles, the Party had nothing more than a worn-out Roneo mimeograph machine. Our Party fighters, dismissed from their government jobs, imprisoned and exiled were passing through particularly difficult times.

Meanwhile, the February regime in Syria was communicating with the Aref regime in Baghdad and making many visits to the Iraqi capital, thus providing their supporters in Iraq with a useful umbrella and enabling them to move politically under less hazardous conditions. At the same time, they were providing the Aref regime with informa-

tion about the Party and with advance warning against its activities and intentions. Scandalously, they proclaimed from Radio Damascus the dismissal of the Iraqi regional leadership, thereby exposing them to the regime and the danger of arrest and endangering the very existence of the Party. The Februarists' Arab and international alliances opened doors for their supporters in Iraq to deal with various political circles, while the Party was constantly under false propagandist attack and isolated.

On the national level, the Party was undergoing similar harsh times on the organizational, political, psychological and material levels. Many Party leaders were under arrest, while a few remained at large but under fear from possible attempts on their lives by the influential machine of the Februarists in their countries or abroad

Party organizations at home and abroad were in no position to give financial and administrative assistance to the national leadership save a very little help unequal to the requirements of conflict with the Februarists.

During the years prior to the Revolution, great efforts were made to hold the Ninth National Congress of the Party. Only in February 1968, two years after the regressive move in Syria, was it possible to hold the Congress. The Party had by



then passed through the longest period in its history to deal with an emergency situation.



## **SECTION TWO**

### **THE PROBLEM OF ASSUMING POWER**

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party had to face at this stage the most serious challenge of its career, which had always been full of great challenges and complex situations.

The challenge this time concerned the very existence of the Party: its future, its relations with the masses and leadership of the revolutionary movement.

The February separatists had usurped the name of the Party, taken over the government in Syria and made significant Arab and international alliances. They had thus put the Party face to face with the question of survival.

As mentioned previously, the struggle between the Party on the one hand and the Februarists and other reactionary and dictatorial Arab regimes on the other was never equal. The gap in potential and opportunity was extremely wide. In the context of things as they stood, time was not on the side of the Party. For in spite of the Februarists false position and their repudiation of the aspirations of

the masses, their continued control of power in Syria and usurpation of the name of the Party for many years would have given them in effect a defacto recognition regardless of any resistance or acts of exposure. They would have enjoyed such a recognition regionally, nationally and internationally. A rectification of such a situation, at that time, would have been well high impossible .

Add to this the confusion of the masses born out of the Party's failures on February 8th and March 8th and the identification of the Party with all the errors of those events, which would require a doubling of effort to communicate again with the masses. Such was the dilemma facing the Party.

What then was to be done to extricate it from such circumstances and present the Party according to its true ideology, slogans and methods? And how to amass sufficient power to pull in the Arab arena struggle where the Februarists were sufficiently existent while the Party aspired to lead the masses revolutionary movement and carry out its national struggle for unity, freedom and socialism?

Many new factors, however, were pressing the Party to think of new ways and means to take over power: The new state of mind among the people and Party ranks after the failures of February 8th and March 8th; both of which failed and turned against the Party in Iraq and Syria; the new climate

arising out of the June 5th defeat, which was blamed by the masses on the Arab so-called liberated regimes; the tidal current which was swelling among Arab intellectuals in search of ways to a new revolution; the Palestine Resistance Movement which had created yet another great emotional upsurge among the Arab youth and strugglers. All of these factors profoundly influenced the thinking of Party leaders and members.

Objective analysis of the Arab situation at that stage, however, showed that the pre-June social forces in power were still in possession of considerable influence and authority in spite of the weakening effect of the June defeat and the great urge among the masses for social change. The trend therefore was to topple those regimes at one stroke in any single Arab country.

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party had, in the context of the above mentioned circumstances and of the revolutionary movement in the area to choose one of two alternatives. Either to abandon completely the idea of taking over power in any Arab country at that stage and embark on a long term programme of popular struggle under the assumption that the Party and the Arab revolutionary movement were starting again from scratch; or to search for a new way of effecting revolutionary change and assuming power in any Arab country,

taking into consideration the requirements and standards of the new phase which should be more revolutionary and more radical. From such a position, the Party would be in the forefront of the mass movement moving towards national and social objectives, in confirmation of the true identity of the Party and the reality of its principles and objectives and of its leading role in the Arab revolutionary movement.

The Party organization in Iraq had clearly unequivocally opted for the second alternative.

The option wasn't new. It had been in the hearts of all since November 19th 1963, i.e. since the Novemberist regression.

This will remained strong and persistent over the years from 18 November 1963 to 17 July 1968. Despite all the fresh events and developments both internal and external, the Party had always felt that the true fight must be to win political power in Iraq and prove the possibility of a mature, integrated, revolutionary experiment under the leadership of a popular revolutionary Party which would be the model and the launching base of a pan-Arab revolutionary movement to unmask the distorted regimes of the pre-June defeat and to fight imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

**CHAPTER TWO**

**THE REVOLUTION OF  
17-30 JULY 1968**





## SECTION ONE

### MEANS AND ALLIANCES

Reliance on the subjective resources of the Party and the movement of the masses solely, meant a very long delay in revolutionary activity with all the consequent negative possibilities therein. Moreover, conditions of the Party, regionally and nationally, pressed urgently for assumption of political power for the reasons already cited. The circumstances in Iraq did not allow for hesitation. The situation in Iraq was going downhill, rapidly endangering all parties in the Arab revolutionary movement and the aspirations to rise from the June defeat and face the new situation with more radical and revolutionary means and formulae. Reactionary and client forces in Iraq were making daily inroads on positions of power and in all public and social institutions. American, British, Iranian and Israeli espionage networks were infiltrating freely most of the political forces. The Army was torn apart with many centres of power. It was

used by many factors, some of which were directly connected with imperialist circles. Corruption and chaos ruled the economy, administration and all other government institutions.

Under these conditions, the situation was fraught with the danger of a reactionary comeback or a military dictatorial take-over, which of course meant the destruction of the Party and the national movement and regression to the pre-July 14th 1958 Revolution era, thus tipping the national balance in the interest of imperialism and reactionary forces.

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, however, was in an exceptionally special position. It carried great moral and material weight in the political life of the country in spite of all the hostile attempts of many political circles to isolate it. Probably because it was the only Party in Iraq which had once gained political power through revolution, many people looked up to it as the only political force in the country actually capable of repeating the action. For in spite of all the criticisms levelled at the February 1963 Revolution, it was still a source of inspiration for many with its many positive aspects which motivated many political elements to resort to the Party.

While preparing for the uprising against the Aref regime, the Party had to stress the following:

- 1 — To work tirelessly within the framework of a progressive national front incorporating as many national and political forces as possible. In the event of failure the Party would have to keep at least their goodwill.
- 2 — To neutralize as many opposing political and military circles as possible.
- 3 — To emphasize special alliances necessitated by the real and technical requirements of the struggle against the Aref regime to assume political authority.

It was virtually impossible from a technical viewpoint for the armed insurgency to bring down Aref without enlisting the cooperation of the Presidential Guard. Thus the need arose for alliance with the commander of the Guard Ibrahim Al-Daoud despite his political leaning and personal ambitions.

As for Abdul Razzaq Al-Nayef, the Party decided resolutely against any cooperation with him in spite of his cunning attempts to approach the Party and explore its intentions. He had in fact expressed a desire to take part in bringing about the change. The Party declined his services decisively in spite of the urging of Ibrahim Al-Daoud to the contrary. For he was considered a suspect element. When the final plans of the Revolution were being drawn up, the Party leadership had assigned an

armed civilian squadron to encircle al-Nayef in his house upon the break out of the Revolution and liquidate him if he tried to resist or get away.

The technical side of the Revolution called for storming the Presidential Guard and capturing Abdul Rahman Aref. Support would be supplied by the Tenth Armoured Brigade which would leave base at Warrar and move towards Baghdad. Special Party armed forces would hinder the advance of counter-reactionary forces. The plans also called for the direct participation of the Party leadership in the attack on the Presidential Guard and the downfall of the regime. This would be in addition to the participation of a number of retired military comrades and other civilian Party members.

Direct participation of Party leaders was thought to be significant in view of the need to emphasize a point which would assume great meaning in the life and course of the Revolution. The leadership should not confine itself to thought, guidance and planning alone, but must also be involved with action and its attendant risks to avoid the rise of duality and the emergence of a gap between thinkers and activists who have to face the real day-to-day problems and take the risks. The new policy would keep the leaders in constant touch with reality and its implications and make their decisions

more realistic. Decision-making would thus become fully respectable.

On the morning of July 16th 1968, the Regional leadership was meeting in full in the house of Regional Party Secretary General Comrade Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr to review and settle the final assignments. Unexpectedly, a messenger from Abdul Razzaq Al-Nayef arrived with an offer from him to participate in the proposed operation. It was revealed that Ibrahim Al-Daoud had in fact informed Al-Nayef of the coming event and proposed that he take part on the understanding that he would become the prime minister of the new regime. The Party leadership had to act quickly in view of this dangerous development.

Participation by Al-Nayef would mean a great change in plans and calculations and grave dangers. The meaning of the Revolution would be distorted out of recognition and the Revolution itself would be in danger of encirclement and/or deviation from its socialist, national and democratic course. On the other hand to decline the offer of Al-Nayef, with his full knowledge of the Party's intentions and in view of his key position in the regime, would only mean the endangering of the Party's existence and the dissipation of revolutionary hopes.

The two alternatives reviewed, the Party leadership decided on a course of pretending to accept Al-Nayef's offer as agreed between him and Al-

Daoud while at the same time making plans to rid the Revolution of both men as soon as possible. The implementation of such a plan was assigned to some members of the leadership.



## SECTION TWO

### FROM 3 a.m. TO 3 p.m.

At 3 a.m of the morning of July 17th 1968, comrades assigned to excute the armed uprising, made **attack** on the tank regiment of the Presidential Guard and took control of it. They encircled the presidential palace and sealed it off. Simultaneously, Abdul Rahman Aref was being contacted by telephone from the Guards headquarters and asked to surrender in return for safe conduct out of Iraq. Initially he refused. But when full fire was directed on the palace and he found himself completely cut off, he offered to surrender. He was taken out of the Palace and sent abroad by dawn.

At Zero count-down of the Revolution, the Tenth Armoured Brigade started out for Baghdad. It must be noted here that the Party leadership, upon receiving unexpectedly Al-Nayef's offer to take part in the Revolution, had expected Al-Nayef to try and play a trick by asking the Tenth Armoured Brigade not to advance toward Baghdad. He would do that, it was thought rightly, in order to have for him and his supporters the upper hand in



the capital. As a precaution, the leadership informed comrades in the Tenth Brigade to ignore any message from Al-Nayef and to advance resolutely toward Baghdad under all circumstances. Things happened as expected. Immediately after Aref's declaration of surrender, Al-Nayef hurriedly despatched an officer to the Tenth Brigade to ask it not to proceed to Baghdad since the Revolution had succeeded. Comrades in the Tenth Brigade, however, refused to comply and advanced according to Party instructions and camped in "Abu Ghraib". On the morning of July 17th, the Revolution's declaration was broadcast over the radio. An extremely delicate and sensitive situation arose in the ranks of the Party and the masses when the first cabinet was announced with Abdul Razzaq Al-Nayef at its head. Party members had not yet been informed of the last minute developments and considerations taken into account by the leadership. They had not yet been told of the decision to liquidate him. It was impossible to explain. For the circumstances dictated that the leadership should pretend to have no reservations about Al-Nayef so that the second part of the plan be implemented.

The Party was under unprecedented stress. For reasons of security the leadership could not explain matters to Party members and had to depend mainly on their confidence and discipline

during the thirteen tough days that followed. The plan devised on July 16th had to be carried out in full.

The liquidation of Al-Nayef was not expected to be easy. He had supporters in the Presidential Guards and inside the Palace where the Regional Secretary General of the Party resided. Any miscalculation by the Party might arouse the suspicions of Al-Nayef and Al-Daoud or any of their known or unknown supporters and thus lead to the liquidation of the Party leaders and supporters alike. Riddance of Al-Nayef however, was bound to clear the situation and the risk had to be taken, after the necessary military and psychological measures were carefully drawn up to ensure the success of the operation.

On July 30th 1968, the liquidation plan was to be implemented. Ibrahim Al-Daoud had left Iraq for Jordan to inspect the Iraqi forces there. At 3p.m of that glorious day, a number of Party leaders arrested Al-Nayef inside the presidential palace in such a meticulous and decisive way as to leave no trace of suspicion on the doubtful elements inside or around the palace. Minutes before the operation took place, instructions were given to the late comrade Hammad Shihab to encircle the palace with the Tenth Brigade and secure complete control of the Guards. Precise arrangements were also made

quickly to send Al-Nayef abroad. At 6p.m. the Regional Secretary of the Party made the historic July 30th announcement over the radio. Thus the liquidation of the conspiratorial clique was successfully concluded.

The time between 3a.m. July 17th and 3p.m. July 30th was the most delicate and sensitive in the life of the Party and the most dangerously far-reaching in effect on the whole future of the Party in Iraq and the Arab revolutionary movement. It was also one of the most glorious, carrying in its womb the risks, pains and anxiety which gave birth to the Revolution of the Party and the Arab masses. It was the Revolution of July 17th, triumphant and advancing towards unity, freedom and socialism.



## SECTION THREE

### WHY “THE WHITE REVOLUTION” ?

For many months after July 17th, the Revolution was dubbed the “White Revolution” .The Party was then careful to promote that image for political and psychological reasons whose effects were spreading over the whole range of Party and revolutionary measures.

Iraq had lived through many years in a state of bloody turmoil. Much blood had been shed by all national forces without any positive result accruing for the benefit of the country or the public. The November 1963 setback showed the shortcomings of the revolutionary experience and the effect on the relations of the Party to the masses was adverse. The leadership of the Party, therefore, decided this time that assumption of power must not be accompanied by bloodshed, in order to keep the Revolutionary image clean and dissociated from the bloody events of 1963. Thus the plan of the Revolution called for meticulous care in bringing down the regime of Aref without any bloodshed.

It was decided to send Aref abroad peacefully. His supporters were treated similarly, in spite of the crimes they had committed against Party members and the people. No revengeful act was to be allowed against the Novemberists and the criminal security elements. Only some were put under arrest, others were left free. Even Al-Nayef was sent abroad to an ambassodorial post at the time and Ibrahim Al-Daoud enjoyed the same treatment.

The leadership was very careful to avoid bloodshed and it gave instructions to avoid violence except in extreme cases where the Revolution and the Party were exposed to danger. No such cases arose at that stage.

The method was extremely useful. The Revolution didn't meet with any strong reaction or resistance. No tension materialized. And the Party was able to conduct itself peacefully through the initial stage of the Revolution and get off to a good constructive start.

The slogan of the "White Revolution" and the tactics were correct and they served well their political and psychological purposes.

**CHAPTER THREE**

**THE PARTY  
AND THE REVOLUTION**

**THE INITIAL STAGE**





## **SECTION ONE**

### **THE PARTY'S EXPERIENCE**

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party had many tasks to achieve. It had to consolidate revolutionary authority and the Party's leadership of the Revolution. Essential problems of regional and national nature had to be faced while revolutionary transformation was launched and protected from conspiracies. The Party had to forge its own way relying solely on its profound faith in its national ideology of democracy and socialism and on its self confidence and the faith of its daring and experienced fighters, and the masses. The Party in fact had no ready example to follow, linking practical application with detailed programmes. All the Party had was faith and a wealth of experience full of lessons and, at times, bitterness.

Of course, the ideology of the Party was, is and will always be the inspiration and the guide for the masses showing the way for unity, freedom and socialism. However, it wasn't an easy matter, under the circumstances, to draw up clearly and progressively a detailed and effective programme and put

it into immediate application. The task in fact was very difficult, complex and costly. Ups and downs were inevitable, always keeping the strategic aims in sight, until it was possible to define the main features of the Party's own revolutionary experience and enable it to help and influence the Arab revolutionary movement as well as the revolution in the Third World.

Thus was the difficult task when the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party took over control of power in Iraq. The Party was able to redouble its efforts to meet the challenge for the following reasons.

- 1 — The new revolutionary experiment in Iraq came in the wake of many complex experiences, especially in Iraq and Syria, which gave the Party a bad image, caused splits and shed anxiety on the future. The Party had to struggle after July 17th 1968 to obliterate the negative effects of these earlier experiments and pave a new course at the same time.
- 2 — The Revolution came after the Arab June [1967] defeat, which created an upheaval in values and standards and tension throughout the Arab World and its revolutionary movement, the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party included. That phase required an exceptionally high level of thought and action to meet the grave challenge. Any ordinary programme which

would have been considered sufficient and satisfactory before the defeat, now came seriously short of meeting expectations.

- 3 — Ideologically, the Party was in a crisis. For in the sixties, it faced the complex requirements of government equipped only with its primary and basic notions which accompanied its birth and emergence in the forties and fifties under less demanding conditions. Development of ideology which began with the Party's attainment of power in Syria and Iraq by 1963 incited many negative reactions and saw the beginning of division. All this was natural enough. But after the setbacks of November [1963] and February [1966], the need for ideological development increased.

Again, because of the negative climate around the Party under these new conditions such as isolation, campaigns of slander, and despair, the attempts at ideological development important and advanced as they were, carried the imprints of that phase.

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, having to face again the task of leading the revolution in Iraq after July 17-30th 1968 had to redouble its ideological efforts in order to strike a balance between challenge and response in all fields of thought, programming and action.

Slogans had to be compatible with ideological content and both had to be on a level with the objective requirements of the actual situation. The Party had to have a creative and dialectical approach while keeping in sight the strategic revolutionary horizon of unity freedom and socialism.

It is obvious then that the Party had to face its destiny and forge its own revolutionary path, relying mainly on its own resources and the Arab mass revolutionary movement. Anxiety in such a case was inevitable. Even uncertainty of correct application of the Party's principles resulting in a sort of discrepancy between thought and application often occurred. Pragmatism was often resorted to in facing the situation. However, this was not the central feature of the Party's experience. It will never be the central feature in the coming phase, even though some similar phenomena are to be expected.

The past phase has been like a difficult birth, full of experiences, problems, success, failure, progress and retreat. The driving force of the phase has always been the principles of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, its strategic aims of Arab unity, freedom and socialism and the faith of Party fighters in their historical

role within the movement of Arab revolution.



## **SECTION TWO**

### **TWO VIEWS ON EVALUATING THE EXPERIMENT OF FEBRUARY 8TH**

Any Party in the place of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, having first taken over power then being forced to relinquish it and finally succeeding in regaining it as it did in 1963, would naturally feel very sensitive vis-à-vis its past experience. Thus, the Party had the first experience at the back of its mind constantly in the wake of reassuming power in Iraq after the Revolution of July 17th-30th 1968.

The Party was determined this time to avoid any such thing as happened on November 18th 1963 and to prove to the masses that the new experience was to be different in methods and results from the first failed experiment.

It was necessary therefore to evaluate the earlier experiment correctly and draw from this evaluation the correct theoretical and practical conclusions.

The Eighth National Congress held in Damascus in April 1965 had, upon the request of the

Seventh National Congress, reviewed a report by the National leadership concerning the Party's experience of power in Iraq in 1963. The Congress adopted that report which was later published in a pamphlet and circulated.

The report was useful at the time for the Party and the masses, in spite of the fact that it had been prepared hastily and when the Party was preoccupied with the crisis in the Syrian Region. The report mainly provided some answers, proved to the public that the Party had made a serious effort to study the reasons for failure and contributed to some extent to the formulation of a united point of view in the ranks of the Party.

The Party however, soon faced another setback on the 23rd of February [1966] which brought back the climate of discord and uncertainty which had the effect of erasing many of the positive results of the re-evaluation of the Eighth National Congress.

The Party upon gaining political power in July 1968 didn't find all the necessary answers in the report of the National Leadership. Of course, times had changed and new problems and circumstances had to be faced daily. New views and evaluations of the experiences of 1963 arose. The views can be summed up under two main trends: First, some comrades thought that the failure of that



phase was due to the kind of alliances, existence of rightist elements in leadership and hesitation in embarking upon radical and revolutionary social transformation which would win the support of the masses.

The second view, held by other comrades, was of the opinion that the 1963 experience was characterized by negligence and haste in taking political, economic and social decisions, clashes with allies and conflict with other political forces. Such and similar reasons led to the failure. The first group of comrades may have perhaps exaggerated their fear of hesitation in declaring the revolution, purging sensitive government machinery of corrupt and bad elements and making the necessary political, economic and social changes. They were pressing for swift action. While the other group of comrades were, on the contrary, exaggerating their demand for cautious and well considered measures required by the Revolution and its principles. They insisted on a slow pace towards political, social and economic progress and on caution in trying to implement the democratic and socialist principles of the Party.

In reality, both outlooks were one-sided in their interpretation of the causes of failure of the previous experiment and in drawing the right conclusions for the present stage.

The 1963 experiment did not fail because of too

much so-called “left” or too much so-called “right”. The main reason for failure was the leadership’s failure in achieving a balance between the ideal and the possible and consequent inability to make accurate calculations of stages and possibilities and a graduated practical programme to achieve the essential targets.

The leadership of the 1963 revolution (i.e. the leadership of the Party at that time) failed to practice its role as a leadership of a revolutionary Party. The Party machine was left without precise and comprehensive central guidance. The Party, consequently, was unable to act as a vanguard revolutionary institution leading the revolution as it should, regardless of the prevailing circumstances and the risks. It lost the initiative, and thus regression became simple and possible.

After the Revolution of July 17th-30th 1968, it became necessary to confirm the correct analysis of the February experiment at every turn and every significant problem facing the Party in order to draw the right conclusion and make the right provisions.

The cohesion of Party leadership, practice of its duties in leading the Party and the Revolution in a serious and disciplined manner and its adherence particularly in the first stage of the Revolution had the effect of achieving the required balance in

the Party and the Revolution, and avoiding adventurism on the one hand and indecision, isolation and timidity on the other.

All Party fighters were very careful to make their revolutionary experiment succeed and avoid catastrophes like those of 1963 and 1966.

This had the greatest effect in keeping the Revolution balanced and on a forthright ascending course regardless of obstacles, complex requirement, risks and the need for exceptionally judicious decisions.

# **SECTION THREE**

## **THE PARTY IN POWER LEADING THE REVOLUTION AND FACING IMPERIALIST AND REACTIONARY CONSPIRACIES**

The urgent task of any revolutionary Party taking control of political power, is to corroborate and protect its authority against attempted conspiracies and encirclement and to strengthen its effective leadership.

Ever since the purge of Al-Nayef and his clique on July 30th, the Party's regional leadership moved in full force to a position of leadership in the new regime by filling the Revolutionary Council which has been composed since then of the regional leaders in addition to three members from outside its ranks. This formula however, was neither official nor overt. The new cabinet was mainly composed of Ba'thists, friends of the Party and allies. Ba'thist military officers who had retired or been relieved of their duties were immediately returned to service, in addition to Ba'thist reserve officers. (Some of these measures had been initiated since July 17th).

The Party began gradually to ask Party members, friends and allies to fill sensitive government posts.

The process of consolidating political power was hard and full of complications. It required a gradual and balanced plan and various formulae which at times seemed conflicting but were in fact connected by the same vision of the future.

As mentioned before, the psychological state and the after-effects of the 1963 experience made any immediate large scale purges intolerable. It wasn't advisable to start any drastic purging of suspect, reactionary and corrupt elements, even those dangerous elements in the army, security forces and sensitive state departments. A different method with more flexibility was required to achieve the same objectives without haste and with careful consideration and attention to the balance of power in the country. Care had to be taken to give every individual a chance to renounce his previous leanings and practices and behave like a good citizen.

This source of action which proved its worth and wisdom, proved also costly to the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party. The Party leadership had to be always on the alert for a possible diversion, always on the lookout, under the constant pressure of events and circumstances, internal and external. They had to be highly qualified, efficient, wise and cool.

Such a method could not have been very clear in all of its aims and justifications. But it was the only safe method to be followed and evolved gradually in accordance with various developments. One of its drawbacks was that the leadership could not explain everything to Party members for reasons of security and secrecy. For the secret intentions could not be divulged without endangering the implementation of the plans. Taking into consideration the anxiety among Party members created by uncertainty, the leadership had no alternative but to depend on the educative effect of the struggle of Party members and the confidence enjoyed by the leadership. Party cadres were no less careful to guard their young Revolution against any repetition of November 18th, by adherence to discipline and patience. The lesson of that experience taught us that formulae and tumultuous methods in taking over control of power in leading a revolution were easy and perhaps comfortable, but did not produce positive results, only disaster as happened at the end of the 1963 experiment. The wise, patient and balanced method, on the other hand, may be nerve-racking and full of embarrassing questions, and even accusations, but it is in the end the correct revolutionary way which will lead the Party and the masses step by step along the road of achievement... and victory.

Objective necessity wasn't the only reason for sticking to the gradual way in placing Party members in governmental posts. There was also the difficult question of Party cadres which were not sufficient for the government apparatus and the ever-expanding Party work. The Party cadre wasn't yet sufficiently qualified in government work. For the Party's experience in government administration had been short-lived and in any case full of errors and mistakes. Few Ba'thists had had any experience in government administration because of their former life of struggle, prison and exile. The vanguard of the Party had carried the main burden of struggle in former times and had had to bear the brunt of the regime's vengeance, hence it had little time for study of training in government.

The Party had to follow various and complicated forms in placing Party members in sensitive governmental positions. This was by no means free of blame and embarrassing situations, but on the whole it was successful.

For some time, there was confusion about Party and official roles. The roles were mixed without any theoretical and clear definition of borders. For some time also, many comrades thought themselves to be in charge of everything in government with the power to intervene in the smallest day-to-

day affairs. Such unrealistic views of self-importance produced many misunderstandings and severed their relations with other non-party colleagues. Some Party members thought that the authority of the Party could only be measured by the number of posts occupied in government. Consequently they called for the filling of all jobs, from minister down to the office boy, with Party members. This was not only mistaken, but was also impossible.

Some steps by the Party in placing Party members in sensitive government posts were necessary but they produced some negative results. For such Party members soon lost all sense of proportion and committed many errors through arrogance. In many cases, the Party found itself compelled to reconsider such cases and consequently make changes in appointments. Those sudden jumps also produced a sort of illegitimate competition among Party members for higher government posts with attendant moral and material privileges. Expectations of some rose high because some equal members of the Party were placed in high positions by the leadership. Such a phenomenon inflated some egos to the extent of opportunism. Some attitudes became negative and irrational.

Some segments of the public could not swallow easily the sudden steps which the Party was com-



pelled to take. The situation was manipulated by some resentful reactionary groups and political circles, not without justification, and found ready response in many quarters including the Party's base. Some Party members with grudges because of failure to function or because of unsatisfied expectations were particularly critical because they viewed government positions as places of privilege rather than burdens of responsibility in serving and leading society.

The Party, succeeded during the past phase in consolidating its leadership of the state and the mass organizations to an extent that makes it capable of safeguarding the regime and apply its programmes, but it must be pointed out that the phase was not free of many errors and negative aspects. It lacked the necessary ideological endeavour to analyze the phenomena and problems facing the Party and to point out the clear theoretical and practical solutions.

In spite of this, comrades who have assumed their responsibilities in the various government posts and popular organizations, have done so with a high degree of honour and efficiency and have played an important role in applying the Party's programme to safeguard the interests of the masses and realize their aspirations.

The Party has been able to protect its Revolu-

tion bravely and efficiently with a minimum of losses, in spite of difficult circumstances on the internal, Arab and international levels. The Revolution's authority has been consolidated and strengthened against all forms of conspiracy, sabotage and encirclement. During the past five and half years, imperialist countries such as the U.S., Britain and other reactionary regimes in the area have mobilized all of their political, technological, material and highly developed informational potential to bring down the Revolution. Some of their conspiratorial attempts even reached the stage of actual execution such as the conspiracy of January 1970. Other attempts were strangled at birth. The leadership of the Party, strugglers and vigilant masses who have maintained the security of the Revolution bearing hardships and taking on the most difficult of missions have always been on the alert for any danger and they have struck at the right moment.

The efficiency of the Party, its apparatus and the solid support of the masses have frustrated the attempts of the imperialist and reactionary states and their intelligence networks which used to boast of their successes in many countries, particularly in the Third World. In Iraq they failed because they were balanced to the point of nervous and irrational behavior.

To face imperialist and reactionary conspi-

racies and their intelligence plans required the Party leadership and the Revolution to make a constant and good study of the balance of power, at home and abroad, and to have an intelligent and accurate estimate of the "next blow" in view of the prevailing circumstances so that the Revolution would not be taken by surprise. A high degree of flexibility was required together with exceptionally complex formulae which were not always easy to divulge and explain on a large scale.

Success in this field was not confined to the mere frustration of conspiracies, but surpassed expectation in discovering elements and tactics while still in the preparatory stage. This afforded the Party and its machinery excellent experience in the means of imperialist and reactionary intelligence services. We can safely say that imperialist and reactionary governments, in spite of all their attempts at connivance, were never really a serious threat to the authority of the Revolution.

We can also say that the Iraqi arena, which had always been full of conspiratorial cliques, bands and groups of various political types and leanings which were on the payroll of imperialist and reactionary intelligence, is now comparatively clean. The Iraqi field is comparatively clean, because of the efficiency of the Party and its energy in confronting plots and conspiracies. No one now

inside the country can pose a serious threat to the authority of the Revolution. It is now also virtually impossible for any imperialist or reactionary plot to succeed by the familiar methods.

**CHAPTER FOUR**

**THE NATIONAL AND  
DEMOCRATIC TASKS**



## SECTION ONE

### POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

The task of achieving political independence had been achieved, in form, by the Revolution of July 14th 1958 which brought down the reactionary monarchy in Iraq and declared the Republic, disengaged Iraq from the imperialist Baghdad Pact and liberated the currency from dependency on the sterling.

The form however, still lacked the political, economic and intellectual content of political independence in a dangerous way which kept the Revolution under constant threat and strain for the next ten years.

Perhaps one of the main problems facing the national liberation movement in the Third World is such an incapacity to achieve the political, economic and cultural content of political independence without which the national will of an independent country cannot be really free.

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, fighting for unity, freedom and socialism in order to rebuild a united, free and democratic Arab society, was ob-

liged to deal decisively with such a problem particularly in view of the fact that it had reached power in an important and frontal Arab country. The Party's duty was to achieve a truly democratic, socialist and integrated state which could be the model for the other states in the Arab World... and the Third World.

The first task confronting the Party in Iraq, in the sphere of achieving political independence, was to liquidate completely all foreign intelligence networks and agents. The task may seem simple to those who are not conversant with the situation of Iraq. It may seem a process of arresting a few people and trying them legally. In reality, the operation was far more dangerous particularly in view of its nationalist dimension created by the Arab defeat in June 1967. It required an iron will free of all fear to fight the imperialist Zionist enemy.

Iraq was like a field mined by American, British, Iranian, Israeli and other intelligence networks.

They had infiltrated the armed forces, the security machinery, the economic institutions, some political and religious movements, some other sensitive centres of government society. Iraq had become utterly exposed to such imperialist, Zionist and reactionary hostility.

The country was severely restricted by such a



grave situation and the freedom of the national will and its objectives curbed. For these networks were not confined to the gathering of intelligence only, but were engaged in direct and indirect influence of policy through agents of imperialism and reaction.

Since early days, Party and Revolution machinery took to resolute action to put a drastic end to such nets of espionage. Thus the public execution of the first batch of spies in the first phase was imperative in spite of the international furore and harsh criticism levelled at our Revolution and people by many quarters, some of which were friendly. Some criticism even came from Party members and organizations outside Iraq.

The public liquidation of the spies was in fact a big national demonstration and an overt tangible reassurance of the liberation of the national will from its fetters. The people had lost confidence in former regimes partly because of their inability to deal with foreign spies who filled the country. It was necessary to gain the confidence of the people, who were humiliated by the existence of spies, and thus gain the enthusiasm for the way of the Revolution with all the endurance and sacrifice it required. If some Arab and international quarters felt that the Party and the Revolution had lost out to Arab and world public opinion because of the public

execution, the tangible fact is to the contrary. The internal gain was real and immeasurable. The people felt for the first time that a real and patriotic, firm and competent authority ruled the country.

The second important task facing the Revolution in consolidating political independence and liberating the national will was to build a strong and central national authority. For it happens in the countries of the Third World that a well intentioned regime without a strong central authority is corroded by conflicts and splits and is consequently unable to direct the free national will in all fields. The weakness of authority and its division among internal centres of power and undercurrents leads it in spite of itself to compromise over basic national issues and renders it an easy prey for infiltration and influence by outside powers, which becomes with time an accepted fact of life.

The consolidation of the Revolution's authority and the Party's resolute leadership gave political independence a real meaning and made it incumbent upon the government machinery and all other elements to act in the national interest.

Admittedly, we have still far to go before achieving such an objective in a comprehensive and absolute manner. But the past five and a half years have proved, in no uncertain way to friend and foe alike and to our people first that Iraq is really

independent with a firm government guiding its destinies and defending its interests.

The ideological and cultural aspect occupies a special importance in strengthening political independence. For when the country is under foreign cultural influence, it finds itself inevitably falling directly or indirectly short of its aims and that its free will is curbed.

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, ever since its inception, paid great attention to such an aspect. It called for educating the masses, particularly the young, and inculcating them with patriotic, socialist and democratic culture to give them immunity against foreign cultural theories and trends of thought which are incompatible with our national and humanitarian aims. Care must be taken to avoid bigotry and cultural isolation. The door must be kept open for thought and culture that serve our objectives in liberation and the building of socialism.

The Party had over the previous years drawn attention to the importance of such an issue which had been almost completely neglected by former regimes. We have achieved some success in the spreading of national and socialist culture. But we still fall short of our ambitions and we must redouble our efforts in this field so that our national will will be completely free and our political independence

consolidated.

The Revolution was careful to emphasize also another very important point, very much related to the safeguarding of our political independence. That point was security consciousness especially in military and economic fields. Irresponsibility in this respect which was prevalent in the past had exposed the country to foreigners who gathered what information they needed to weaken the independence of the country and hinder its progressive and free development.



## **SECTION TWO**

### **ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE**

Economic independence is a central aim of the liberation Revolution. It is parallel in importance to political independence and also complementary to it. For without real economic independence, political independence loses its most important pillar and meaning and remains constantly threatened.

Economic independence in the Arab Revolutionary movement, and Third World revolution in general to which the Arab Ba'th socialist Party belongs and occupies a leading position, carries special importance. For it has become the main point of struggle for political independence between the old imperialist empires such as Britain and France after their downfall and the new emerging nations, the Arab countries included. The economic field had become the new arena for manipulation by the neo-imperialists under the lead of the United States of America. The neo-imperialists have consistently tried to exploit the backwardness, divisions, weaknesses of the emerging nations and their

ever increasing needs for commodities by trying to rid their newly-won political independence of its true meaning.

Economic imperialism resorted to various new forms of manipulation, direct and indirect; it has employed extremely clever methods perfected and complex so that struggle against such ways has become much more complex than mere fighting against military occupation or political hegemony. Some of the methods have become so highly deceptive and suspect to the extent that counter struggle has required a very high level of political and economic consciousness together with a resolute national will and great efforts.

Imperialist control of basic national sources of wealth such as oil was one of the most dangerous forms of economic exploitation.

The development of such resources by the emerging nations required great material, technological and administrative potential on an international scale which the underdeveloped nations did not possess. The imperialist countries were thus in a position to exploit such an advantage, by imposing their extortionist terms while appearing to be doing a kind service to the underdeveloped nations. The revenues of the underdeveloped nations from their national wealth were ridiculously small. Struggle to regain control of the wealth

was extremely perilous and reminiscent of the Iranian nationalization experiment under Mous-sadeg in 1953.

Economic imperialism took yet another dangerous form: in attempts to delay development in the newly independent nations or to direct such a development towards permanent economic dependence in spite of vast outlays in development projects. The policy of loans plays a very dangerous role in this scheme. American imperialism and its allies used this policy cunningly by flooding the newly independent countries with loans to be invested in trifling unproductive projects leaving those countries under the false impression of economic activity and increased employment. Years pass, and the underdeveloped countries find themselves still in the same position of underdevelopment -but with their economies irretrievably in pawn to the imperialist creditors and without a free national will in spite of the outward forms of political independence and the verbiage attendant upon it.

Encouragement of consumerist trends by imperialist states and corporations among the newly independent countries was and still is another important tool of neo-imperialism. The markets are flooded with attractive well-made goods which become habit-forming for the citizens and a fulcrum



of a different set of values with the following consequences:

a) Emergence of a wide and active class of merchants and middlemen tied to the imperialist market by virtue of its selfish interests. This class is inimical to national liberation and economic independence. It tries in every way to influence the policy of the state.

b) Creation of an aversion to usually less well-made national products thus lessening the incentive for industrialization.

c) As a result the government finds itself in the difficult position of being unable to control the balance of foreign trade and incapable of following a national industrialization programme. The country falls into the category of constant buyer, non-productive consumer and a seller of primary products at best.

In leading the Revolution of July 17-30th 1968, the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party found itself duty-bound to wage a complex and many sided fight in order to achieve economic independence in a decisive manner as the Party understood it and as it believed in such an independence as a revolutionary Party fighting for the unification and freedom of the Arab Nation and for the building of socialism and democracy. The Party had fought Arab regimes for such an independence

which they had failed to achieve.

Economic independence became an exceptionally important target after the defeat of June 5th. The defeat revealed ailments and some very dangerous failings in the Arab condition therefore making comprehensive and radical struggle inevitable. Economic independence in fact became a central condition for liberating Arab will and enabling the Arabs to challenge the imperialist Zionist enemy. The defeat and its aftermath also revealed the importance of the economic factor as an effective weapon which could and must be used by the Arab Nation in its struggle against imperialism and Zionism.

Iraq, which had achieved political independence with the Revolution of July 14th 1958, remained until the Revolution of July 17th 1968 under the imperialist economic hegemony as represented mainly by the big monopolies which controlled our main source of income: oil. Consumerist trends, neglect of economic growth and development, the serious problem of the balance of trade and a chaotic policy of borrowing from and trading with foreign governments, all had grave consequences on the economic independence of the country and its political free will.

The decisive battle in Iraq to achieve economic independence, and thence political independence

is the battle of liberating the oil wealth from the control of imperialist monopolies in planning, production and marketing. Without tackling this, Iraq would remain under foreign economic control, and any progress that might be achieved in other fields would still be lacking and threatened. The Revolution, however, had a long and difficult way to go before embarking on the oil battle and achieving complete success.

The Revolution had to make the necessary political preparations before plunging into such a dangerous and comprehensive battle. It had first to consolidate the authority of the Revolution and the leadership of the Party. It had to make progress towards solution of the Kurdish Question, to strengthen relations with the other national parties and political forces and to improve relations with the other Arab countries or at least halt the deterioration of relations while establishing any possible economic relations. It had to establish strong ties with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp and also establish good relations with France and many other European and Third World countries.

The Revolution had also to make the necessary economic preparations for the battle in order to be able to choose its time and secure the requirements of success.

These political and economic preparations for the battle were at one and the same time compatible with the principles of the Revolution and its tactical and strategic aims. They served their purpose perfectly in the battle of nationalization and set the Revolution on the road forward.

The Revolution had inherited from the Aref dictatorial regime a chaotic and bankrupt economy. The State treasury was almost empty. It was unreasonable to enter into a decisive battle with the oil companies at that stage unprepared, particularly since oil revenues formed a high percentage of the State's budget and of the development budget.

The Revolution, therefore, had to concentrate for some time on general economic reform and minimizing dependence on oil revenues. This was by no means easy since oil revenues occupied an exceptional position in the economy of the country. And a few years were not enough for a radical economic reform to transform it from backwardness to progress.

The Revolution, however, had no alternative but to struggle with all available means to achieve quickly economic independence. It succeeded to a great extent in creating a climate of public opinion conducive to economic reform, and in lessening dependence on oil revenues. That was very impor-

tant psychologically and materially in the fight with the monopolies, the fight that ended in our triumph.

An extensive effort was made to develop agriculture and reduce agricultural imports. Likewise, industrial development received a boost. Shutdown factories were put back into operation. Hard currencies were saved. Consumerist trends were curbed and foreign trade was so directed as to conform with the development plan and the requirements of an economy saving on hard currency. As in military battles, where an army cannot win a big battle without proper training and the winning of smaller battles as experience, so political and economic battles cannot be waged without adequate preparation. Those political and economic preparations were essential to liberate the oil wealth. The need arose for smaller battles in the field of oil in order to gain the necessary experience and information on the way to the decisive battle.

The Revolution had, from the beginning, to enter into two battles: national exploitation of sulfur. Iraq is rich in crude sulfur. Imperialist monopolies, particularly American, had since the days of the monarchy tried to win control over this resource. Under Aref, Pan American almost won the sulfur concession but for the opposition of the masses and national forces led by the Arab Ba'th So-

cialist Party. When the Party assumed political power, it had to prove that the people were capable of exploiting their own wealth. In the first year of the Revolution, we were able to reach an agreement on cooperation with Poland in the field of the national exploitation of sulfur. That was the first battle against the monopolies in which the Revolution proved its freedom of will and laid the cornerstone of national minerals industry.

In the field of oil, Law No. 80 of 1961, according to which the government appropriated all unexploited areas of oil concession, remained ink on paper until the Revolution of July 17th. The National Oil Company which had been established in 1964 was weak and inefficient, controlled by some rotten and suspect elements. Its role was confined to following the contract agreement with the ERAP Company of France providing for the exploitation of those areas covered by Law No. 80.

Many attempts had been made in the past by the monopolies to by-pass Law No. 80 and render it void of its national content. In 1965, the government of Taher Yahya was about to mortgage the relinquished lands to the monopolies under the cover of a joint venture. The Party had opposed that project strongly and was able with other national forces to mobilize public opinion against it and cause it to fail.

Success in national exploitation of oil was considered a decisive step against the oil monopolies

and the freedom of the resource. In July 1969, the Revolution concluded cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union for national exploitation of oil. The oil monopolies considered that step a dangerous challenge to their interests and future in Iraq. For a long time and with all means they sought to abort that move and render its national meaning hollow. But it went through with success, thanks to the resolute national will, and brought its first fruits on April 7th 1972.

During that time, the Revolution and the government was active in Arab and international fields and through OPEC to secure greatest possible rights for the producing countries and to increase the price of oil. The Tehran agreement of 1971 increased considerably the oil revenues of Iraq and other producers.

Oil nationalization was a high strategic aim of Arab revolution. It was the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party that coined the slogan of "Arab Oil for Arabs".

The idea of oil nationalization began to be entertained seriously in the summer of 1970 after the unpublicized failure of negotiations between the government and the oil companies. It dawned then upon the Party that the companies were trying to contain the Revolution by delaying tactics to gain time for its downfall.

At the end of 1971, the government summoned the companies to negotiations that were to be decisive. From the outset the government made the companies feel that the Revolution viewed the relationship in both political and economic terms and that it would not go back on Law No. 80 or allow any compromise of the basic rights of the people to their national wealth.

Negotiations were an important field for a trial of strength and for discovery of the companies tactics. From the Revolution's political, economic, financial preparedness and from the course of the negotiations, the companies found that they were facing a totally new situation which they had not faced before in Iraq or in any of the oil producing countries. They apparently felt that they were being cornered and that the Revolution might in the end achieve partial or total nationalization. The companies therefore resorted to hard bargaining and delaying tactics, and when they fully realized the Revolution's unswerving position they decided to strike first by considerably reducing production. This was meant to hold up the development programme and prevent the Revolution from saving the necessary hard currency, causing it to be discredited and unable to do anything for the people. The companies thought they would thus be able to handle the Revolution, humiliate it, and even



bring it down.

The leadership of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party understood this game in spite of all the euphemistic excuses of the companies. The Revolution decided to open fire on the companies and issued the famous two-week ultimatum on May 17th 1972.

During this glorious period in the history of our Party and the people, the Revolution carried out a wide-scale mobilization of all popular forces and organizations. A general feeling of national urgency prevailed. Support for the Revolution was widespread and the people expressed their willingness to sacrifice. Just a few days before the ultimatum was issued the leadership of the Party decided to put its popular front course into action as a necessary political requirement for the confrontation. Two communist ministers were taken into the cabinet. When the ultimatum expired and the companies were still offering excuses and delays, the Regional Secretary General of the Party announced the historical nationalization decree to the people. That was on the first of June.

By making the decisive move of nationalization, the government realized economic independence and took control of 65% of the oil producing sector of the national economy which, alone, had been under alien control, save for a small proportion represented by the Rumeila field. The govern-

ment was now in control of 99.75% of the land from which oil is extracted.

Nationalization had far-reaching effects beyond the mere question of political independence according to its usual meaning. For the oil monopolies are not just foreign commercial companies in control of a small or a big sector of the national economy in this country or that. They are a gigantic international octopus extending across many continents and closely associated with the strategic interests of imperialism and the delicate position of the great powers.

Confrontation with oil companies is thus a direct confrontation with imperialism at its nerve-centre.

The nationalization decision in Iraq contributed effectively to the exposure of the energy crisis in the West and the revelation of its grave political and strategic dimensions. Nationalization in Iraq was, rightly so, the beginning of a new international era paving the way for basic changes in the balance of world power in favour of the movement for the people's liberation.

On the national level, nationalization in Iraq had a very important dimension. It was the first real blow by the Arab people to imperialism since the defeat of June, 1967. It was also the first taste of triumph for the Arabs for a long time. It rallied

the people and created a widespread spirit of enthusiasm amid a climate that had been hitherto dominated by a sense of despair and defeat.

The Arab homeland, in spite of political division and the differing regimes, is always affected directly or indirectly by any radical political, economic or social change that takes place in any part of it. As the possessor of the largest crude oil reserves in the world, the effect of the Iraqi nationalization on it was profound. Voices throughout the Arab World were raised clamouring for oil nationalization and for the strangling of the foreign monopolies. The reactionary Arab oil producing regimes were deeply embarrassed particularly after the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party had shown up correctly the issue of oil as a national issue of political content and as a firm reply to imperialist and Zionist aggression and usurpation. The Party raised the slogan of using oil as a weapon in the battle against the imperialist Zionist enemy.

Successful nationalization of oil is very difficult and risky politically, economically and technically, even when confined to simple cause and effect. The Party and the Revolution having realized the greatest achievement since the Revolution of July 17th, had to embark on the most difficult of battles and exert their utmost in order to make it succeed. For many serious matters, regionally and national-

ly, depended upon its success.

Indeed, many circles, some of them friendly, were not sure of its complete success. Their expectations, at best, did not exceed partial political rather than economic success. The Party, the people and all national forces for nine glorious months faced the big challenge with great daring, tackling all political, economic, psychological and administrative problems of great complexity and delicacy.

Mobilization and the gaining of support in Iraq, the Arab World and internationally had to go hand in hand with intelligent tactics cognizant of the political circumstances in Iraq, the Arab World and the World at large and of the balance of power. The Revolution thus secured all provisions for complete success in battle.

The leadership's nationalization decision on 1 June 1972 did not include the Basrah Petroleum Company for two important reasons. The first being that it was a good source of hard currency which was needed to enable the government to stand up to the pressures of the monopolies and secondly it gave the Revolution room to manoeuvre the companies, forcing the companies to accept nationalization as a fact of life and acknowledge Law No. 80. Very significant was the leadership's decision to grant France a privileged position in the nationalization act.

At the same time, the stance of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries in support of nationalization was important politically and economically.

The political, economic and technical provisions made by the Revolution for the complete success of nationalization put it on the right course from the outset until complete triumph on March 1st 1973. The attitude of support and large scale activity by organizations, parties and progressive movements in the Arab World and the world as a whole had a great effect in creating international support for the decision and in curbing imperialism and its monopolies and conspiratorial programmes.

Support was constantly expanding. No serious economic crises occurred. The Revolution had taken temporary measures of economy and the citizens were responding. Marketing of nationalized oil was on the way. Significant volumes were sold to states and companies, some of them in the West. We had sold almost all of our nationalized oil before reaching agreement with the companies in March 1973.

Reaching agreement with the companies was necessary in order to settle such outstanding problems as the after-effects of Law No. 80, the question of expensing royalties, other government claims, compensation, the continued flow of oil in pipelines

via Lebanon and final acknowledgement of nationalization as a recognized legal fact. This is in addition to the necessity of reaching agreement with the companies concerning future production in the southern fields in accordance with the principles and demands made by the government prior to nationalization.

It was necessary to define the basis and rules of negotiations with the companies. Two views on the matter were circulating at that time. One view overstressed the political prerogative of nationalization and was calling for no flexibility in compensation, while the other view was under the fear of the difficult economic situation created by nationalization and alarmed by the movements and criticisms made by the reactionary and defeatist elements. This second view preferred to confine the matter to the economic side calling, under the economic circumstances, for leniency with the companies in order to return to a normal financial and economic position without the taking of too many risks.

Both views failed to deal with the situation in a correct way. The first view was only superficially revolutionary because it did not take into consideration the fact that real revolutionary actions should be accompanied by some degree of

flexibility and tactical manoeuvring to ensure its success without compromising its essence, that nationalization cannot be considered only politically, important as this side was, without consideration of its economic benefits in creating a better life for the people. The second view was rendered irrational by fear, and void of the vision which would assume a higher degree of persistence and confidence in the Party and the people and their ability to manage such a decisive battle.

The leadership prepared a detailed analytical report on the subject in which all probabilities were expounded. Fixed political and theoretical positions for managing the negotiations were laid and with stress on the necessity for flexibility in matters of secondary importance.

The basic points in the leadership's study were: 1) That the battle for nationalization must be waged and won without any infringement on its meaning and political dimensions regionally, nationally and internationally. 2) Which is closely locked with (1). That the economic and financial side must not be neglected. The nationalization battle must be directed on the basis of guaranteeing a good financial flow after victory so that the people can feel the economic benefits of nationalization in addition to its political, national and revolutionary purport.

After approval of this programme by the leadership, negotiations were conducted along those lines. The companies, through mediators at first and directly afterwards, tried to sound out and explore our ability to persist to the bitter end. They found that the Revolution would not draw back. Their art and cunning tactics collided head-on with a resolute stance and yet more cunning tactics. The leadership itself supervised the battle, not leaving it in the hands of technocrats and officials, although they did their loyal best. For the leadership was dealing with every contingency large or small, from a wider and integrated vantage point of politics and economics. In the end, the companies had to give in. Agreement and victory were achieved in March 1973. The national purport of nationalization was maintained and all the attendant economic benefits accrued to the country.

The Revolution through this heroic battle had realized major progress towards complete economic independence. The Iraqi economy was now largely led and directed by the national interests within the framework of the Revolution and its principles. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party was able also, through this historic step, to transfer the Arab struggle to a new higher plane compatible with the challenge posed by the defeat of June and the requirements for the new stage of struggle with



imperialism and Zionism. It opened a new chapter in the Arab national and social struggle with far-reaching future effects.

The nationalization battle had strengthened the Party's hand in leading the revolutionary movement and society. It has made many circles inside the country and outside look a new at the Party with respect and appreciation. This has had a very important political effect both nationally and internationally.

**Imperialism** and its reactionary allies in the area who had been irrevocably defeated were forced to recognize the victory of our Revolution. But they will continue to think and plan, in vain, of ways to punish our Party and the Revolution for such an historically bold action.

During the period prior to the agreement, immediate measures were taken to construct the strategic oil pipeline from Haditha to Fao to ensure the export of our oil via the Gulf and the Mediterranean at one and the same time. The project guarantees the transport of northern oil to the south and at a second stage from the south to the north giving us a higher degree of flexibility under various strategic requirements and future necessities in addition to the economic benefits.

When the October War broke out, the Revolution was faithful to the revolutionary slogan of

using oil as a weapon in the battle. It immediately nationalized the American share in the Basrah Petroleum Company, then the Dutch share and finally Gulbenkian's. Thus 85% of the country's oil production came under the control of the people. Economic independence became an established fact.



## SECTION THREE

# THE KURDISH QUESTION

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party's view of the Kurdish Question and its attempts to solve it were based on the following basic considerations:

- 1 — The Kurdish national movement in Iraq, despite some historical circumstantial errors and reactionary isolationist trends some of which were on openly good terms with imperialism and reactionary circles, is essentially a legitimate national movement so long as it works within the framework of national rights for the Kurdish people within the Republic of Iraq. Autonomous Kurdish rule is realistic and justified. And the movement as such is considered a basic part of the national movement in Iraq.
- 2 — The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party is national, humane, socialist and democratic in its tenets. It is only natural that it should understand and recognize the legitimate rights of the Kurds and struggle for their fulfilment. The Party, having been in power since July 17-

30th 1968, bears responsibility for guaranteeing these rights in constitutional, legal and procedural forms.

- 3 — The basic and constant course adopted by the Party to guarantee and safeguard those rights is the peaceful and democratic course through sincere and positive cooperation with the national and progressive forces of the Kurdish masses and within the framework of joint national action as represented in the popular national and progressive front.

In the light of these considerations, the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party has worked with all the means at its disposal since July 17-30th 1968 to find a solution for the Kurdish Question. Admittedly the problem has become very complicated because of foreign interventions, the chauvinistic and dictatorial attitudes of the former reactionary regimes towards the Kurd's legitimate rights, protracted armed fighting over many years and because of the state of the Kurdish movement itself, together with many other factors.

Indeed, the Kurdish Question has been the most difficult problem confronting the Party and the Revolution in past years. The Party had to find a solution, theoretical and practical, that would satisfy the national aspirations of our Kurdish masses while protecting the territorial unity of the

land and the unity of the national progressive movement without conflicting with the aims of the Arab struggle.

The Party found the ideal formula which was integrated theoretically, politically and practically. The formula was expressed in the great historic document of March 11th 1970 which is considered a turning point in the struggle of our Kurdish masses and the struggle of our people in Iraq as a whole for the building of a democratic progressive and prosperous society.

It must be mentioned that when the leadership of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party decided to cooperate with the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party within the framework of March 11th announcement, it did not ignore the erroneous policies pursued by some segments of the said Party and their suspect connections with separatist and reactionary circles and their separatist tendencies. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party took its historic decision in spite of its knowledge of these facts and their implications. Its stance was based on the correct analysis that the Kurdish national movement by nature of its structure and its level of development, must contain various trends which should not be judged from one aspect only. It is the responsibility of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and other nationalist forces in the country to help create the

right conditions for the development of the Kurdish movement towards the commitment to the national unity and the course of democracy and progress in the country.

Peaceful conditions and persistence in applying the articles and provisions of the March document together with efforts to erase the painful effects of armed conflict which lasted for years, and the realization of a quick and wide development programme in the North, together with work within the framework of a front that includes Arabs, Kurds and all other fraternal minorities and their progressive forces would create the aforementioned conditions.

The course of the March announcement, however, was not what the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party had hoped for. Many errors were committed in dealing with the Kurdistan Democratic Party, some of them committed by our Party machinery and by the authorities. Perhaps this was because of the many uncoordinated centres that were dealing with the various aspects of the Kurdish issue. This led eventually to loss of central control over events and developments and to involvement in secondary matters and details at the expense of the main issues and central views. Many times, it even led to an inability to know what was really going on and differentiate between errors by the authorities and

anticipated before and after the March announcement. These elements committed large scale sabotage and conducted propaganda activity against the Party and the Revolution at home and abroad. They were and still are forming a rallying point for all elements hostile to the Party and the Revolution whether they be Arabs or Kurds. They cooperated with conspirators against the Party and the Revolution and gave shelter in the areas under their control. They are still to this day openly cooperating with the reactionary states and imperialist forces in the area to weaken and destroy the Party and the Revolution. These trends and elements are now forming the primary reserve for the forces of imperialism and regression in Iraq.

The Kurdish Question, however, must not be measured by the attitudes and behaviour of these elements and trends whose true intent is now widely known in Iraq, the Arab World and the rest of the world. It is a national question and its responsibility falls on all the benevolent forces in the nation led by the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party.

The Party, in its capacity as leader of the Revolution, is chiefly responsible for the unity of the country and the interests and rights of its people, both Arabs and Kurds. It is responsible for safeguarding independence and providing the requirements of progress. The Party, therefore, was and



will be responsible for the solution of the Kurdish Question according to permanent and correct political principles within the framework of the national progressive front.

We must confess that the errors committed already have greatly harmed the progress of the Revolution. Without those errors, we should now be in an advanced position on the way to a peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish Question and should have been, through correct political means, in a position to weaken considerably the evil elements which try to exploit the legitimate aspirations of the Kurdish masses for other ends, rather than in the interests of the masses, all the masses of Iraq.

However, in spite of all the errors and negative aspects, the peaceful democratic method of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party in tackling the Kurdish Question has proved to be correct and has yielded significant positive results. Over the past four years, the Revolution has discharged all its commitments as expressed in the announcement of March 11th regardless of the behaviour and attitude of the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the exceptional circumstances prevailing in the area.

After four years of persistent struggle to solve the Kurdish Question peacefully and democratically-

ly, the general political, psychological and economic trends of the Kurdish masses are no longer as they used to be before the March announcement. Large sections of our Kurdish people are now finding their lives more secure and peaceful than ever before. They also feel directly the results of the Revolution's policy in fulfilling their legitimate rights and improving their standard of living. Continued peace over the past four years has created new economic conditions in the Northern area. A greater number of Kurdish citizens are now associated with the agricultural, industrial and commercial activity, which is more linked with the country's economic structure than before.

The establishment of peace and order which has succeeded in realizing many industrial, agricultural, irrigational, touristic and public service projects in the North has created conditions conducive to ultimate peace. The task of provocative elements, urging mutiny and destruction, has become much more difficult than before. Their attempts often meet with negative response by our Kurdish masses in spite of all their means of provocation, terrorism and deception.

## **SECTION FOUR**

### **THE PROGRESSIVE FRONT**

The task of establishing the progressive front was one of the most prominent and important tasks faced by the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party since the early days of Revolution and during the past few years. The Party felt a historical responsibility for establishing it.

Since the late fifties and through the sixties, the experiences of struggle both on the regional and national levels proved beyond all doubt that all the setbacks suffered by the struggle stemmed from grave basic faults, foremost of which was the deviation of Arab progressive forces from joint direct conflict against imperialism, Zionism and reactionary forces to infighting among themselves. This is seen clearly in the deviation of the July 1958 revolution, the failure of the Egyptian-Syrian union and the setbacks of November 18th 1963 in Iraq and February 23rd 1966 in Syria and of course the major Arab defeat on June 5th 1967.

This correct analysis, as stressed in documents of the Ninth National Congress, had to

works of sabotage effected by certain elements of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Some government officials, particularly in the North, were unable to understand properly the letter and spirit of the March announcement and so continued to handle matters in the wrong way, perpetuating the state of affairs prior to the announcement.

On the other side, the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party often did not behave in the spirit of national unity and sincere alliance with the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party which had presumably been established after the March announcement. Many leading elements in the Kurdistan Democratic Party considered the March announcement and the alliance good only for tactical gains and an opportunity to make more demands. We have found nothing, since the first days after the March announcement, in the behaviour of the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, or at least the effective and prevailing element in it, to match our expectations. On the contrary, we felt that the leadership was intensifying emergency patterns in its dealings with the government and making suspect relations with foreign powers.

In the meanwhile, the influential separatist, suspect, client and reactionary elements and tendencies in the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party were not on the decline to the degree

apply itself in the new phase of our Party's struggle either against dictatorial, reactionary and corrupt regimes, or on a positive plane in the form of assuming power in an Arab country.

In Iraq, the establishment of a united progressive front after assumption of power by the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party was confronted by the following basic facts:

- 1 — The history of popular front activity in Iraq and its previous errors and negative effects.
- 2 — The balance of political power in the country after the Revolution and its relation to the structure, permanence and programme of the front.
- 3 — Definition of the tasks of the front on the regional and national levels and the fundamental necessity of the front being an effective link in the struggle to establish a united Arab progressive front and all attendant duties.
- 4 — Definition of a clear programme for the solution of the Kurdish Question, for without such an agreed programme it would be useless to establish a front.

The Party's relation with political circles in Iraq on the eve of the Revolution of July 17th had been burdened with negative past experiences of conflict in spite of the efforts that the Party had exerted before the Revolution to improve such relations.

Experience proved that the establishment of close positive ties of cooperation between the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and other political circles in Iraq was no easy matter, it was, in fact, extremely difficult and complex. It required time and a great deal of theoretical, political and practical preparation. Often, past experiences of conflict gave suspicion the upper hand. Theoretically, all parties were agreed on the necessity of working together. In practice, the automatic psychological reflexes worked against such a cooperation mainly because of the special temper of the Iraqi people. It is perfectly true that the attitudes of political parties must conform with their theoretical stands. But in reality this was not easy to apply and it needed time and exceptional efforts.

The lapse of a comparatively long time before the establishment of positive relations of understanding and cooperation between the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the Communist and other progressive nationalist forces was to a large extent a result of the need for the gradual creation of understanding and cooperation against the accumulation of previous experience. New problems had to be tackled one by one as they arose and the effects treated wisely and correctly.

The question of the balance of power within the front, with the Ba'th being in control of govern-

ment, is a sensitive and thorny problem. The balance must be established on a realistic basis in order to be productive and permanent. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party after the Revolution of July 1968 raised the issue in a new and precise manner. The Party must of necessity occupy a distinguished and leading position. This was achieved through the Party's success in applying during many years a realistic and correct policy and through its success in consolidating its authority in the face of attempts of encirclement and conspiracies.

The Party was careful, having secured its leading role in the front, to make it a working proposition in reality and not merely in form. For the front must be influential and capable of expanding regionally and nationally. The Party exerted care to deal with all powers within the front in a spirit of mutual respect and confidence, while working at the same time to develop and strengthen its role of leadership in government and society.

Morally speaking, the Party had to prove its true worth as leader of the masses and a leader of the liberating, democratic and progressive transformation in the country. It had to bridge the gap between itself and the masses with confidence and consolidate its position and relations, nationally and internationally, in order to keep its leading position in the front and Society by persuasion.

The great achievements of the Party over the past five years, such as oil nationalization, the March Manifesto regarding the Kurdish Question, agricultural reform, the general development plan, the Iraq-Soviet Treaty and vanguard participation in the fight against imperialism and Zionism particularly during the October War, all of these and other achievements have clarified the identity of our Party and proved to the masses in our country and the Arab Homeland and to the world progressive forces the extraordinary ability of our Party to lead the Revolution and fulfil its central tasks.

The establishment of the front between our Party and the Communist Party July 16th 1973 was considered by all as a proof of its capacity of achievement and an assertion of its correct patriotic course not just a mere bridge for survival in government. The difference between these two considerations is essential and has historical dimension.

The initiative taken by the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party in putting forward the concepts and political content of the solution for the Kurdish Question, as embodied in the March 11th announcement, significantly enhanced the moral aspect of the Party's leading role in the front and Society.

Many local and other circles had thought the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party incapable of putting



forward an integrated programme for solving the Kurdish Question. They were under the erroneous impression that the Party, being Arab nationalist, did not possess the theoretical and conceptual capability for the solution of such a problem and had had no tangible experience in this field. The best they expected from the Party was a reasonable, graduated political programme which would solve some aspects of the problem and freeze the armed conflict with the Kurdish movement, thus gaining a temporary truce.

The Party's success in putting forward a conceptual and political programme proved the originality and the humane democratic nature of its nationalist outlook. It also proved its practical ability to handle so complex and sensitive a problem.

The March 11th announcement, on the other hand, was considered by the Party as a solution to the Kurdish Question which would contribute to the unity of the national movement in Iraq after its having been one of the main reasons of conflict. Thus one of the biggest obstacles to the establishment of a progressive front in Iraq was removed. Definition of the tasks and role of the front on the Arab national level took a good deal of discussion with the other parties. It needs intensive ideological and political effort.

The questions of unity and the liberation of Palestine occupy a central position in the struggle of the Party both ideologically and politically. Regional and national circumstances played a fundamental role in defining the extent of divergence between our Party and other parties concerning these two issues before we reached agreement.

The Party could not have gained support for its views on these questions before asserting its leading position in the political life of the country.

Arab circumstances in general during the past years have also played a big role in bridging the gap. For many years the Nasserite view and policy was prevalent and gaining in support concerning these questions while our view was being criticized. This was a reason for the widening gap between our Party and other parties, making agreement virtually impossible.

The important developments that took place in the Arab arena and the emergence of Iraq as a revolutionary and frontal force in the area with strong pull gave the theoretical and political stands of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party added weight unheard of hitherto.

Such a development, on the regional and national levels, made it possible for other parties to enter into agreement with our Party on a united programme concerning these two questions which

was compatible with our theoretical and political stands. This was expressed in the documents of the National Action Charter reached with the Communist Party July 17th 1973 and published August 26th of the same year.

The intensive many-sided theoretical and political activity of the Party during the previous stage had paved the way for the establishment of the Progressive National Front.

It can be safely said that the time taken and the efforts consumed were not wasted and that the Front came at the right time and in the right pattern.



# **SECTION FIVE**

## **DEMOCRATIC**

### **TRANSFORMATIONS**

Ever since its emergence in the forties, and throughout its struggle in the Arab countries, the Party has made the provision of democratic freedom for the Arab masses an essential condition for national resurgence. The Party, through its theoretical effort and practical struggle for democracy, was able to define its general theory of democracy as one of "popular democracy".

The Party's "popular democracy", though it was explained generally in Party literature, still needed to be born-out in practice by the Party in power. Past experiences of the Party in power in both Syria and Iraq had not afforded such an opportunity. On the contrary, the Party's image was tarnished and distorted by the errors committed. Now it was the responsibility of the Party, having assumed power, to embody its theory of popular democracy and enrich it with practical application to make it an inspiration for the Arab revolutionary movement. The way was fraught, however, with stumbling blocks and complex

material and psychological problems.

Iraq had been one of the poorest Arab countries in democratic traditions and practices aside from their social meaning. It had passed from one dictatorial regime to another from the days of the Ottoman rule until the July 17th 1968 Revolution. It had enjoyed only small intervals of freedom of thought, press, parties, unions and the practice of the parliamentary game.

This depressing heritage and its spiritual and material aftermath weighed heavily on the life of the people and also on the country's political

life. During the ten years preceding the July 17th 1968 Revolution, fierce bloody conflicts and the dictatorships of Qassem and Aref intensified despotic practices at the expense of democratic relationships.

When the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party came to power in Iraq in 1963 it found that, despite its desire to practice democracy, it was unable to extricate itself from dictatorial relationships before it was forced out of power in November 18th 1963.

Upon re-assumption of power in July 17-30th 1968, the Party had an intense desire for democracy, but in the light of precedents and prevalent circumstances it had to proceed cautiously and try and find gradual formulae toward its vital objec-

tive.

The first phase was characterized by intense centralism within the Party, government, popular organizations and society. It was perhaps necessary to stabilize the Revolution. It was also necessary to build up confidence in the Revolution whereas instant democracy at the beginning might not be appreciated for what it was. In this way any democratic step fulfilled gradually would be a credit to the Revolution registered in its favour.

The main effort in the building of democracy in the first phase for some time afterwards was directed towards the establishment of popular organizations such as labour unions, farmers' leagues, students, women's and professional organizations. Guarantees were provided to develop the political, economic and social effectiveness of such organizations. In spite of the centralist formulae applied in the formation of such organizations in line with the objectives of the Revolution, they soon fanned out in an unprecedented way in the country and expanded their bases. They functioned in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the country and had mass communication media of their own. They had started to play a prominent role in the society of the Revolution.

Many professional organizations such as the union of lawyers, the society of economists and

later the teachers' union, were formed under leaderships of national unity representing the Arab Ba'ith Socialist Party and other progressive political forces.

Even in its first phase, the Revolution allowed ample opportunity for other parties to publish their own periodicals. After the March announcement, an Arabic-language political daily under the name of al-Ta'akhi (Fraternity) was published by the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The paper is still in circulation. The Communist Party was given a license to publish a political and cultural monthly under the name of al-Thaqafa al-Jadida (the New Culture). It was also licensed to publish a weekly al-Fikr al-Jadid (the New thought) and a political daily Tariq ash-Sha'b (the People's Road). A number of democrats were given a license for a cultural political magazine al-Thaqafa (Culture).

Party and official press and information media were under strict central supervision. They remained so for some time. Some of them, however, particularly al-Thawra (The Revolution) the central Party organ, were used at times to run wide-ranging dialogues on some basic national issues such as the Kurdish Question and the National Front. These papers were given some freedom to criticize the administrative and cultural machinery, but



the experience proved to be of little value. Heads of bureaus under fire took the matter personally instead of viewing it as means of widening popular participation.

We must acknowledge, of course, that such **erroneous** attitudes harmed the development of democracy in revolutionary society. For in the absence of wide constitutional democratic institutions and popular supervisory councils, the Party would have to pay special attention to practicing criticism in its press which is there, after all, to deal with problems. Had this matter been dealt with properly, a better democratic climate and ground-work would have been created in the revolutionary society led by the Party.

More than two years ago, people's councils were started. It was a significant step in the right direction even though such councils had not acquired the precise requirements for development and growth. The councils have been established in most districts, cities, subdistricts and quarters. They have contributed to better relations between the masses and the government.

The peaceful solution of the Kurdish Question is also another sign of democracy. In addition to its significant aspect in consolidating national unity, political independence and social progress in the country, it has provided the opportunity

for the first time to create a democratic climate for our Kurdish people to practice their national rights, political, social and cultural activities on a very large scale. The March announcement made it possible for the Kurdistan Democratic Party to operate publicly on a large scale. Many Kurdish organizations of students, women, writers, etc... were formed.

The peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish Question profoundly influenced the development of democracy throughout the country, despite all the obstacles that hindered its application. The dialogues and discussions that took place publicly in the papers over the Kurdish question and the criticism levelled against the erroneous stands of the Kurdistan Democratic Party established some form of democratic tradition in discussion and the expression of opinions on national issues.

Administrative and cultural safeguards for national minorities such as the Turkmens and the Assyrians were of great democratic importance. For they started to enjoy rights never enjoyed before and were given the chance to pursue cultural, social and artistic activities which enhanced their feelings of citizenship and belonging.

The National Progressive Front, which came

into being on the fifth anniversary of the Revolution, by agreement between the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the Iraqi Communist Party on a pact of national action and principles of work within the Front, is considered the most important democratic achievement of the Party and the Revolution during the past five and a half years and one of the most important democratic measures in the whole area.

This front, particularly after it acquires all the necessary elements and institutions, will play, under the leadership of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, a wide and decisive role in building the popular democracy aspired to by the Party and will be an ideal source of inspiration for the Arab revolutionary movement as well as of significance in the Third World.

The past five and half years can be summed up as a phase of laying the foundations for the popular democracy and for applying formulae that suit the objective conditions of the Revolution. In spite of all the circumstances referred to previously, the Party has been able to fulfil essential tasks in this field, most prominent among which was the granting of the freedom of the press and political parties. It is now able to enter a new phase which is the completion of the components and institutions of a people's democracy.



**CHAPTER FIVE**

**TASKS OF SOCIALIST  
TRANSFORMATION**



# **SECTION ONE**

## **THEORETICAL PROBLEMS ...AND OBJECTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES**

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party is a socialist revolutionary Party which considers socialism imperative for the liberation, union and resurgence of the Arab Nation. The Party seeks to propagate socialist values and ideology and apply them in practice in its struggle, and in every respect in accordance with the requirements of each phase wherever possible in any part of the Arab World and within a unionist horizon. For an integrated Arab socialist system can only be applied within the context of Arab unity i.e. in a united Arab state

Thus, Ba'th-led revolution in any single Arab country and the political regime controlled by the Party are in essence and aims socialist, unionist and democratic. The Party must apply a programme of socialist transformation in accordance with the requirement of the phase in that area. This of course applies to the Party in Iraq. We must review the circumstances of Iraq concerning socialist transformation.

The political situation in Iraq differs from that in other Arab and Third World countries in many respects. This is so, apart from the special features and peculiarities affected by the monarchy which will be dealt with later on. Before the Revolution of July 17th 1968, three changes of regime took place on July 14th 1958, February 8th 1963 and November 18th 1963. Each of these changes had its positive and negative effects on socialist transformation which further complicated an already complex matter.

During the monarchy, semifeudal production relationships prevailed in the countryside. A small capitalist sector existed in agriculture and some limited areas in Iraq. Bourgeoisie and feudal interests intermixed. The bourgeoisie owned the land and practiced usury with peasants while some feudal lords owned industrial and commercial projects. Despite the extensive land ownership of the feudal lords and the bourgeoisie, the State was the biggest land owner. The State also owned facilities, production and essential services such as electricity, railways, a significant portion of communications and a part of the oil industry. After 1953, the State became, without doubt, the biggest capitalist in the country and began building many comparatively large factories such as textiles, sugar, cement, etc. . The capitalist sector in industry was



comparatively small and weak. The bulk of it was small or middle class. Commerce was the best field for the Iraqi bourgeoisie. Internal and foreign trade prospered in the last few years of the monarchy. The period was characterized by the spread of consumerist tendencies, unbalanced increases in the incomes of employees, professionals and other, as a result of increased oil incomes and expanded economic activity spurred by large-scale projects under the auspices of the Development Council in particular. The contracting sector expanded and was one of the most corrupt profit-spinning sectors. Legal and illegal profits were made under the corrupt political and social system prevalent at that time.

After the July 14th 1958 Revolution, Law No. 30 on agricultural reform was issued which limited the amount of land which could be feudally owned. Small and middle-size ownerships increased greatly. But because of the reformist rather than the revolutionary nature of the law and the many loopholes compensation was guaranteed as was the choice of land for distribution among relatives and favourites. The bureaucratic and rightist nature of the Qassem and Aref regimes compelled them to introduce modifications in the interests of the feudalists. Apalling conditions prevailed in the countryside in Iraq.

The feudal influence, though theoretically and legislatively destroyed, was still very strong on the eve of the July 17th Revolution. It gained in strength because of the misapplication of the law and the run-down of the agricultural sector. The small holdings sector created by the law of agricultural reform was weak and unproductive. Farmers lacked capital, seeds, machinery and market expertise. Arable land decreased because of increased salinity and government negligence. The farmers' inability was compounded by the increase in the number and influence of usurers. New exploitative relationships appeared as a result of the leasing of lands, which the farmers, beneficiaries of the land reform, could not work on, to the bourgeoisie and feudist classes. In the North, old patterns of ownership and feudal relationships remained intact because of armed conflict.

The number of landless peasants increased in the countryside as did the exodus to the cities. Lower agricultural productivity made Iraq, for many years after the revolution of July 14th 1958, an importer of agricultural produce after it had been an exporter or at least self sufficient. This was not the result of population growth or increased consumption.

In the industrial field, the July 14th revolution brought about many significant progressive deve-

lopments. The agreement of economic and technical cooperation concluded with the Soviet Union in 1959 led to the creation of industries which would establish decisively the State's sway over this vital sector and build a new industrial infrastructure in the country. At the same time, the government provided wide opportunities for the growth of the private sector in industry through loans, protection and other facilities. But the nature of the two bureaucratic regimes of Qassem and Aref was counterproductive. The implementation of many projects in which large amounts of capital had been invested was delayed. By the time some projects were finally completed, they were out of date technologically. Maladministration made many projects uneconomic. Measures to prepare the required personnel for industry, such as technical schools and the sending of student missions abroad to acquire skills, were not taken, which further increased the economic difficulties of these industries.

In 1964, the Aref regime nationalized many large and middle - sized factories belonging to the private sector. This increased the dominance of the public sector in industry and confined the private sector to small and middle-sized industries and to some mixed public-private industries. Such a progressive step would have produced better

results had it not been for the impetuous way in which it was taken and the insincerity of its motivations. The nationalized industries came directly and indirectly under the mismanagement and corrupt manipulation of the rightist bureaucrats and bourgeoisie class. Thus, the progressive step was emptied of its progressive content. The industrial public sector became a burden on the state, a drain on the budget instead of a source of income and hard currency.

The July 14th 1958 Revolution did not impose any essential changes on internal and external trade which remained largely in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Indeed, the Revolution made the first step towards establishing a public sector in internal trade by the establishment of the governmental Transactions Department. Nationalization decrees in 1964 enlarged further the trade public sector. But the general phenomena of corruption prevalent in the industrial and agricultural sectors were also apparent in commerce. The State did not reap any benefit. Only some basic consumer goods were provided for the people at reasonable prices.

Perhaps the most important results of the decrees of 1964 were those concerning foreign and Iraqi private banks and the insurance companies. This sector, despite the prevalent corruption, maintained a degree of efficiency under state control.

It should be noted, however, when evaluating the nationalization measures that the public sector had been itself the highest shareholder in the factories and corporations that were nationalized.

This may indicate that the nationalization was propagandistic in nature, and may explain also why it was later emptied of its progressive content.

It is clear therefore that the Revolution of July 17th 1968 had to face three tasks in the field of socialist transformation: 1) Rectification of the prevalent corrupt conditions in agriculture, industry, services and commerce. 2) To achieve speedy and comprehensive growth. 3) To take preparatory measures to secure the transition into socialism. It is natural that these aspects should interweave in the interests of achieving economic independence.

Reform requires large scale administrative and organizational power. It also requires changes in government structure and methods of work and legislation. There is a need also to emphasize national and progressive cultural values. Because of the relative scarcity of national cadres, in particular, socialist and revolutionary cadres, for such tasks, it was necessary to depend on the available national cadres without emphasizing their class identity and ideological background.

At the same time, socialist transformation

relies on socialist culture and on socialist revolutionary cadres to confront the bourgeoisie and the remnants of feudalism. That is why it is no easy task to fulfill the process in its three aforementioned aspects. It involves many-sided activity, great flexibility of means, no loss of equilibrium, a meticulous attention to the circumstances, quick resolution of the contradictions that arise and a singleness of purpose that would lead in the end to the realization of socialism.

However, the shortcomings in ideological activity and the weakness of socialist education among the circles concerned made this task more difficult and led the Party and government machinery into many errors. A trial and error method was often followed. While it is true that experimenting is necessary, it is true that it needs clear theoretical pointers to make it meaningful and purposeful. This was lacking in the past phase. Many things were done without proper theoretical framework and scientific research. They were not accompanied by revolutionary re-evaluation, at a distance from subjective outlooks and narrow interests. It has been therefore very difficult to measure real success or failure. Even inability to draw accurate conclusions greatly affects the capacity of the Party and the Revolution to measure the rate of progress in this sphere or that.

Among the unhealthy phenomena which deserve special attention is that of reliance on “accumulated achievements”. In the first days of the Revolution there was an urgent need for projects to employ the people and give them a feeling of confidence in the Revolution.

Time and temper did not allow for long-range efforts. Quick results with direct moral and material impact on the masses were wanted. But to continue in this way trying to win over the masses with semi-planned projects, to deceive oneself that this is the socialist way is mistaken and can lead to chaos not only in the political, economic and development fields but also in the fields of thought and social development. For this would impede the development plan and work against the completion of the necessary steps in the preparation for the application of socialism.

Accumulation of achievements in this sense is not only born out of a weak socialist culture and ideological activity but also out of complacency by some Party members and organizations who try to take the easy way out, shying away from hard work with the masses and long term effort. Even self-seeking trends amongst the unions, who fought only for their own sectional gains without enough attention to the interest of society as a whole, hindered the course of socialist transformation.

In addition to this there has been some later confusing of socialist tenets and State capitalism, the democratic content of socialism which requires dialectical commitment to centralism, and other chaotic thoughts and practices. Centralism with a democratic content must be differentiated from the centralism of state capitalism which was rejected by the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party as contrary to the interests and ideals of the Revolution.

The Party's awareness of the risks of deviation towards state capitalism, and its continuous education against such a deviation, compels it on assumption of power to exert special effort towards complementary socialist democratic transformation.

State capitalism is a distorted image of socialism. It negates or at least fakes democratic relations in production, freezes the role of the working class and kills its vitality. It makes the bureaucrats, the masters and overlords of production who impose upon the working classes and lower strata of employees, a new **dictatorship** not very different from that of the bourgeois class and its exploitation. It has a distorted view of socialism as a mere economic activity unrelated to the other aspects of the life of Society.

Justifications of centralism with democratic content are one thing and the centralism of the capitalism of the State are another. They are con-



tradictory and run counter to each other. When the working class, its organizations and some officials of the various production sectors are not sufficiently aware of this, it is the responsibility of the Party to raise their cultural, technical, organizational and political standards in order to protect the interests of all in Arab society. It is our responsibility to meet any such lack of awareness and not allow it to obstruct the development of the working class by sliding into State capitalism.

Lack of awareness and experience is not helped by preventing the working class from taking part in the actual programming and control of development, thus depriving them of ever acquiring the necessary experience and knowledge regarding the problems involved.

## **SECTION TWO**

### **TRANSFORMATIONS ON THE ROAD TO SOCIALISM**

#### **1 — Agricultural Reform:**

One of the main tasks of the Revolution was to make radical agricultural reform very early on. It was necessary to effect changes in the reform machinery and put it under the supervision of the Party. It was also necessary to modify radically the old agricultural reform law of 1958. The modifications were made in 1969 and cancelled compensation for the feudal landlords and their so-called land option for the areas left to them under the old law. The land was distributed free to the peasants.

This stemmed from an outlook which does not recognize feudalists' ownership of land or any other privileges over the landless peasants. The Revolution issued another new law for agricultural reform, No. 117 of 1970, which reduced the maximum area of land ownership aligning it more closely with the conditions and requirements of agricultural production and afforded protection of the poor peasants' rights. Expropriation and redistribution

of land were carried out all over the country, except for a few areas in the North where abnormal circumstances prevail.

The Revolution of July 17th achieved the great mission which should have been realized by the July 14th revolution. Feudalism and feudal relationships in the Iraqi countryside were obliterated. Legal status of land ownership under the Revolution was **confined** to small and medium size holdings.

Production relationships underwent a significant change. Arable land in Iraq is equal to 23 million donums. State farms occupy 390 thousand donums, collective farms 64 thousand donums, and cooperative farms 11 million donums. The State owns a further 2 million donums which have been contracted out to farmers collectively. Private and other forms of land ownership hold 8,400,000 donums.

Such development is of significance. The back of feudalism in Iraq has been broken. No material or legal supports for it have remained outside some tribal and backward social links which are on the decline. Except for the North, there is no feudal influence in the country. Democratic practices in the countryside have progressed and developed with the participation of farmers' leagues in the political, economic and social life of the country.

New production relations and traditions are replacing the old ones. It must be added, however, that in spite of all this progress in the countryside the model is still not socialist. New measures must be taken to increase the socialist sector (state farms, collective, and cooperative farms) to render it dominant and better in all respects. Efforts must be redoubled to spread socialist culture among the farmers.

There remains the fact that the arable land is still not enough for the farmers. In spite of the new agricultural reform law and the reduction of the maximum ownership, a large number of farmers are still landless and obliged to labour for wages with the small or medium-size owners, or migrate to cities. This number will increase with the natural population increase and the spread of farm mechanization. Larger numbers of landless will find themselves working for wages on the land or going to cities. Exploitative relationships will develop and new kinds of contradictions will appear. The division of land into ever smaller pieces, in spite of its democratic and progressive purport, will have negative results on general development and productivity. We have seen how the old agricultural reform law did not lead to the development of agricultural production, but on the contrary led to its decline.

The Revolution has made important progress along the way to establishing cooperatives, collective and state farms. Still this sector has not yet become the leader of agricultural production. We can see that the past phase succeeded in preparing the Iraqi countryside, where forty percent of the population live, for socialism. During the next five years, it is inevitable that the development of state farms first, the collectives and finally cooperative farms will lead agricultural production in no uncertain fashion.

## **2 — Industry**

The Revolution was not faced with the issue of nationalizing major industrial schemes in the course of social transformation. These were nationalized in 1964 as mentioned earlier. The public sector in industry was predominant.

The Party faced other tasks in this sphere of socialist transformation:

- a) Completion of unfinished industrial projects which had been delayed for years.
- b) Implementation of contracts for new industries which had been signed but for whose implementation no serious steps had been taken.
- c) Expansion of existing factories and boosting of their output capacity.
- d) Introduction of new industrial fields.
- e) Building a new administrative and organizational

nal infrastructure commensurate with the size and role of this sector and development of its administrative and technical aspects.

f) Provision of Party control and guidance together with guarantees of working class participation in solving the problems of production.

g) Encouragement of national capital to build new small and medium sized industrial projects and the establishment of mixed projects so that the expertise of the bourgeoisie may serve national growth and development.

During the past years, great efforts have been made in all of the abovementioned directions. In spite of all the positive results that have been realized, the industrial sector is still suffering from the basic problems prevalent in developing countries which delay the transition to socialism. This is in a society where the problem of public ownership of industry has been solved and socialist transformation should have been facilitated. Some of the problems of our industry lie in former chaotic planning which did not take into consideration the provision of basic raw materials for such industries to make them economic. Many industries were forced to close down because of the lack of materials locally or to cut-back production because of inability to compete with similar better and lower-priced foreign products. Such industries have become a

burden on the state instead of a source of income.

Another problem was that of trained cadres of engineers, technicians, skilled labour and administrators for industries. The result was underproduction, higher costs and low quality products. The projects needed budgetary help from the state.

The industrial infrastructure that has been developed may in the future help socialist transformation. But most of the measures taken so far resemble state capitalism rather than socialism. Participation by the working class and other employees in this sector, in the fields of planning and execution, is still limited and lacking in political, economic and technical consciousness. Industrial production at present is dominated by officials among whom the ratio of Party members and socialists is not high enough. We must also confess that some Party members working in this field, who are supposed to be the leaders of socialist transformation, are not paying enough attention to socialist culture and practices. They have at times come under the influence of bureaucratic and rightist trends because of contamination by the old pre-Revolution apparatus. They have not succeeded in building relationships based on centralism and democracy with workers and employees to the required extent.

Government measures to control industry and

expand the industrial infrastructure are important and progressive. But they cannot, of necessity, be socialist without the working class efficiently occupying effective, worthwhile positions of leadership. Socialist education on a wider scale is needed. Re-education and training of the untrained on all levels is also required in accordance with a pre-conceived plan. The industrial infrastructure must be capable of leadership and better production both qualitatively and quantitatively. We must remember that in all world experiments of socialist transformation, the field of industry was always the first and easiest field for practical application.

In all cases, a balance must be struck between our principles and goals and the practical requirements for achieving these goals. Working class participation must be preceded by the adequate political, education administrative and technical training of all the required cadres. We must benefit from the experience of the other socialist countries in redefining the term "working class" to encompass new social segments while being very careful to keep the basic qualities of the class and its revolutionary nature.

### **3 — Commerce:**

Large commercial institutions were nationalized in 1964. The Revolution faced other tasks which



were mostly difficult and interrelated. The commercial sector, under government control, was the most corrupt and rotten of all sectors. Parasites were cosily ensconced making large illegal profits by all means of connivance and trickery.

The revolution had to guarantee through this sector the continued provision of basic materials, while struggling to extend its effective control over foreign and internal trade and subject them to planning. This was not easy because of the lack of trained Party members and the corrupted national personnel.

During the past years many reforms in this field were instituted. Corrupt managers were removed and replaced by Party and other incorruptible managers. Parasitic elements were wiped out particularly in the fields of import licensing and public sector agencies. The public sector's share of foreign trade rose from 43% to 82%, large individual importers were broken into small and medium-sized ones, thus limiting the influence of big merchants and benefiting increasing numbers of smaller merchants. In the field of internal trade, the public sector's activity dealing directly or through middlemen with the public increased. The public sector entered new fields of internal trade and significant weight.

In the last few years, many measures have

been taken to align the conditions of foreign trade with the requirements of economic independence and development.

However, during the past years, real war both direct and indirect took place between the Party and the Revolution on the one hand and the commercial bourgeoisie and rightist bureaucracy on the other. The commercial bourgeoisie class is distinguished by intelligence and cunning together with an ability to play tricks. It is also the class most committed to the capitalist market and imperialist interests. The rightist bureaucracy meets with the small and middle bourgeoisie class in many interests and practices making an unwritten alliance against the progressive and socialist measures of the Revolution. This is particularly dangerous when the government machine and the economy is saturated with the rightist bureaucracy. The danger is even greater when the revolutionary cadre is small. The Revolution had at times to strike mercilessly, and at other times to resort to flexibility, in dealing with these two classes.

The real field of struggle with these two classes remains in the realm of efficiency. The State now has decisive control in political, legislative, material and security matters over all sectors. It can strike a destructive element and carry through any necessary legislation. But violence and legislation

alone cannot solve the problem even when they are necessary. For consumption is a daily affair which can never be closed down or postponed. Reserves of materials must be built up. When the State machine cannot provide the requirements, the Revolution will be balanced and isolated. That is why the question of the qualified cadre focusses attention. For without such a revolutionary, sincere and enthusiastic cadre, the task of socialist transformation becomes impossible.

Admittedly many errors in the trade sector have hurt the Party and the Revolution and contributed to the delay in socialist transformation. Comrade, the Regional Secretary General of the Party referred to this in his speech on the fifth anniversary of the Revolution by saying: "It is necessary to mention errors in the field of internal and external trade which have caused hardships to citizens and been detrimental to some programmes of growth. The country has seen cases of shortages or chaos in the provision of basic and secondary consumer needs. A situation such as this opened the door for reactionary and regressive forces to belittle the Revolution and its achievements and socialism."

In fact, errors and crises in this field were most harmful to the Revolution because of their effect on its direct relations with the masses. The Party

had warned against such situations instructing its members in this field to redouble their efforts and enthusiasm in order to develop their institutions and facilitate the transition to socialism. We must confess, however, that the leading Party members in charge of such a mission did not exert the required effort and enthusiasm. They behaved in fact more like backward bureaucratic elements thus adding insult to injury.

In addition to this, we must not neglect the effect of increased and unexpected state revenues which have caused a bottleneck in the movement of trade. Increased revenues required sudden increases in economic activity entailing a full review of the volumes of import. Such import volumes cannot be dealt with through short notice formulas. Likewise sudden increases in development budgets cause difficulties in absorption and indicate coordination.

#### **4 — Planning and Growth:**

Planning occupies a central position of importance in the building and development of the national economy and all of its branches in accordance with present and future needs. Without planning, preludes to socialism cannot be made and national progressive economy cannot be developed. This is particularly so in developing countries where production institutions are not

particularly strong and viable. We have already shown the bad effects of chaotic planning which were inherited by the Revolution.

Therefore, it is absolutely necessary for the Revolution to build advanced planning machinery which are socialist in orientation, to advance the cause of planning consciousness in Party and government and to make responsibilities stick so that they are never rejected except with very real political or economic justification. Any emergency change in plans must be confined to the smallest area possible.

Work in the field of planning by the Revolution was characterized in the first phase by study and exploration in order to get acquainted with the economic and planning conditions, rectify whatever possible and develop the human and technical resources of planning. It was necessary to get the required information and to prepare the tools for planning.

The Revolution was able to make great progress in this field. It can be said now that for the first time in Iraq, there are planning mechanisms of fairly high quality and efficiency. What has been achieved, however, still falls short of the pressing needs of the country. The reason for this lies mainly in the national human resources in this field and the lack of a united planning philoso-

phy among those who work in this field . Many elements are still oscillating between bourgeoisie, socialist and state capitalist trends and are unable to reach a single crystallized view. The dangers are of course immense. We may not see the harmful results of such a situation now in the phase of wide development, but we shall certainly meet with the difficulties when the Revolution enters finally and comprehensively the phase of applying socialism. We shall see then which of the projects already carried out facilitate the task and which stand in its way. It is necessary therefore to deepen the socialist unionist culture among planning workers by acquainting them with the experiences of socialist countries whose situation is similar to ours.

Another reason for the slow progress in the field of planning was the lack of coordination among the various sectors because of narrow attitudes as opposed to the adoption of a higher more comprehensive view in order to define the limits and requirements.

The leadership of the Party and the Revolution has paid special and direct attention to planning. It has supervised personally during the past years the preparation of the general plan and its follow-up. The question of planning has entered now a new important phase in realizing growth and the preparation occupies a control position of great

importance. In our country and similar countries, it often comes directly after political and economic independence and it requires urgent attention. In our country, it gains an added importance because of the immense oil wealth in Iraq and the neighbouring areas. For in such areas, development and growth play a vital role in the struggle between the progressive and reactionary regimes. Development becomes a case in point and a test for the regime.

Iraq cannot ignore attempts to show that widespread progress comes only through ties with imperialism and the pursuit of capitalist methods. We cannot neglect the fact that if such attempts are not aimed originally at Iraq, their outcome will affect Iraq and the Party's revolutionary principles and socialist changes. The struggle therefore between the progressive course and the reactionary must be resolved in the interest of socialism and counterimperialism. The socialist way must be proven right. This requires, in addition to socialist changes, a large scale growth in all aspects of life. It requires the development of all modern conveniences and raising the standard of living continuously for the masses by following flexible and advanced methods to face the challenge.

The achievements of the Revolution in the

field of development and growth during the few past years can be summed up as follows:

Three main considerations in formulating the struggle of national development were taken:

**First:** Objective study and analysis of the inherited Iraqi economy to discover the gaps, define the resources and find out the potential.

**Second:** To build a strong developed economy that would increase continually the level of incomes and at the same time bridge the income gaps, the social classes and the various districts of Iraq.

**Third:** Liberation of the Iraqi economy from all vestiges of foreign domination.

These general lines of strategy were translated into the following programme:

1 — Endeavour to develop the forces of production and productivity and the use of all the resources of modern technology to build the national economy.

2 — Great expansion in human and material investment to ensure speedy and balanced development in economic and cultural fields. .

3 — Coordination between investment and savings with emphasis on national savings in order to develop self-propensity for growth.

4 — Coordinating the policy of consumption with the requirements of growth so as to realize a surplus in national savings and fruitful investment in



accordance with the aim of development, that is raising the standard of living.

5 — Expanding the export infrastructure and diversification of exports, ensuring higher productivity, better marketing and a definition of the aims of production and imports in the interest of a higher standard of living for the masses, a higher per capita income and the provision of the requirements of production for all productive units.

6 — Increasing the awareness of the masses and encouraging them to participate in the growth effort.

In order for the Revolution to translate its strategy of growth into concrete projects and programmes, it had to take the following steps:

1 — Implementation of the scientific method in planning by making comprehensive studies in place of the segmented and instant economic

2 — Preparation of a comprehensive plan for economic and social growth involving a detailed programme of production, income, labour, consumption, savings and foreign trade with all requisite investments and resources.

3 — Participation of all economic sectors in planning and discussions with experts.

4 — Strengthening the executive structure in the public and private sectors.

5 — Strengthening and development of the

statistics and planning machinery.

6 — A realistic and accurately calculated policy of loans.

The preliminary results of these policies proved the correctness of our revolutionary methods. The Iraqi economy grew in the years after the Revolution at a higher rate than throughout the pre-revolution years.

In 1969, the Iraqi national income (at current prices) was nearly 869 million Iraqi Dinars. This rose to I.D. 1218 million in 1972. It is expected to reach I.D. 2550 million in 1974 by the end of the Plan. This means an increase of I.D. 1654 million between 1969-1974 over and above the income during the first years of the Revolution, which means a 185% increase and an annual rate of growth of 24%. This rate of growth is the highest the modern Iraqi economy has witnessed.

Per capita income in Iraq rose from ID 100 in 1969 to ID 120 in 1972. It is expected to reach ID 230 by 1974 which means an annual rate of increase of 20% . This is quite unprecedented for Iraq.

The rapid economic development in our country did not come as a result of an increase in oil income only, but also from growth in other sectors of the economy.

The agricultural sector's income increased

from ID 202 million in the first year of the Revolution to ID 302 million in 1972 at an annual rate of growth of 15.3% between 1969 and 1972. In spite of a decrease by ID 50 million in 1973 because of uncontrollable climatic conditions, the income is expected to rise to ID 350 million in 1974.

Income from converted industries increased from ID 103 million in 1969 to ID 154 million in 1972. It is expected to reach ID 205 million in 1974 which means an annual rate of growth of 14% between 1969 and 1974.

Estimates of employment show an increase from 2.5 million in 1969 to 2.9 million in 1972. The figure is expected to reach 3.2 million in 1974. With the exception of the agricultural sector, total wages and salaries in 1969 were ID 321 million. They are expected to total ID 510 million by 1974.

Investment in the 1970-1974 Development Plan totals ID 1560 million, ID 953 million of which were invested in the central government sector, ID 322 million in self-financed production institutions of the public sector and ID 285 million was contributed by the private sector. This total investment is twice as much as the investment in the five-year plan of 1965-1969 and twice the total of the public sector's investments.

## **5 — Public Services**

Provision of the best and widest possible range of public amenities for the Iraqi people is born of two considerations: one is purely economic relating to productivity while the other relates to the social theme of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party which enjoins provision of the masses with the best available services.

Public amenities in our country also occupy a central point of importance. It is often the standard by which a government is judged by the populace.

In our country, aside from the psychological factor, almost the whole burden of public services is laid upon the shoulders of the government. This is in part also, because of the weakness of the bourgeois class as an institution, consequently the weakness of private service concerns. The government therefore has to provide the whole range of public utilities such as health, education, electricity, public transport and others, regardless of the political or class identity of the government. It is more natural that these utilities should be provided by a socialist government and that the government should be expected to do so by the population.

The services sector on the other hand can easily become a monstrous apparatus siphoning off public money to no real use.

Two points have therefore to be taken into consideration: first, close association between services and their economic and social implications. The second point is that services must not be at all considered a grant, and horizontal and vertical expansion must be closely related to the plans of socialist transformation.

The fixing of the rate to be exacted by the government for services must also be related to the needs of the classes involved. Health services for instance are more needed by the lower-income classes. The rates should therefore be commensurate with their incomes.

The wide difference between the people of the country-side and the population in cities must also be taken into consideration. Otherwise, peasants will flock to the cities in search of the good life and agricultural activity will lag. The improvement of public transport plays a big role in solving this problem.

Public services, in size and quality, have made a large stride forward under the Revolution. The need, however, is still great and efforts must be redoubled, so that the aim of the Party in building a new society can be achieved.

In addition to paying the greatest attention to the needs of the lower income groups throughout

the country in the field of health services the Revolution has particularly emphasized preventive medicine in future planning.

Spending on health services increased by 40% in 1973 as compared to 1968. The number of hospital beds was increased by 8000 to 20,3222 in 1973. The distribution of the increase was equitable. In 1968, there was a medical doctor for every 4,200 citizens. This rate has been improved considerably to 1:3,200 in 1972. Medical orderlies increased by 57.8% between 1968 and 1972. Improvement was not only in volume but also in quality and the uniform distribution of services.

The law of health insurance in the countryside insured 70% of the population of Iraq. 400 doctors are employed in the countryside using the most up-to-date equipment.

In education, spending reached ID 59 million in 1970 against ID 49 million in 1967. In 1967, there were 990 thousand school children in elementary schools. The figure jumped to 1,110,000 in 1970. In the same period the number of students engaged in higher education increased from 30 thousand to 38 thousand. Students engaged in vocational training increased from 10 thousand in 1967 to 12 thousand in 1972. The increase in vocational training, however, was not up to requirements.

The pre-Revolution state of drinking water

in the countryside was miserable. 96% of the population in the countryside were deprived of potable water. Only 1.2% of the villages of Iraq were equipped with proper facilities for drinking water. To achieve its long-term aims the Revolution had to draw up an appropriate plan. The first phase ended in 1973; the second followed immediately at the beginning of 1974 and will take two years. ID 80 million will be spent to provide Iraq's villages with clean drinking water facilities. The execution of the plan will take many years.

In the middle term, ID 28 million have been allocated to provision of water for cities and large villages. Daily production of drinking water has increased from 175 million gallons in 1968 to 260 million gallons now. It is noteworthy however, that the present policies, middle and long range will only cover 90% of the needs of cities and towns and only 5% of the needs of villages.

Likewise in the field of electricity supply the Revolution inherited a very backward state of affairs. ID 16 million were allocated for the 1970-74 plan of which ID 7 million were spent in 1970-72 which demonstrates a good rate of execution. Studies are still underway to bring electricity to the whole of Iraq.

In the field of housing, public spending before the Revolution tapered off to zero in 1966-67.

The Revolution has revised the programme by spending ID 10 million during the existing development plan in addition to about ID 16 million on other housing programmes such as the development of the North, industrial housing, Bedewin settlement and border villages. Such projects are expected to be completed within the next three years. A long range housing plan aims at building complete housing facilities in the cities and the countryside in Iraq. The Revolution aims at incentive housing in the countryside that would help change the existing tribal economy by giving priority to collectives, cooperatives and statefarms, to encourage socialist relations of production. Short and middle term plans of housing are only to meet the immediate needs. But a long range plan must be developed in full coordination with all sectors.

The Revolution was careful to tap the touristic resources of the country. A long range plan for tourism is being drawn up. Income from tourism increased by 75% in 1971 over 1967. This rate of increase had been only 29% in 1967 over 1963. ID 5 million will be spent on the development of tourism under the plan. Such an investment will encourage touristic institutions to participate more in social and economic development.

One cannot talk about development in tourism



as separate from the social and economic general development of the country. Without all other developments, the development of tourism remains confined to buildings.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **THE ARMED FORCES**



The Armed forces generally and the army in particular are considered to be one of the most important pillars of society: the Army's role being to defend the country against any kind of aggression. Other armed forces, such as police and security forces are to protect the country's internal security against internal and alien sabotage. It is only natural that the State should build and equip such forces so they can carry out their duties.

The army in our country and many other Arab and Third World countries has an exceptional importance in view of the decisive political role it plays. In our country, the army has played a direct role in the political life since 1936. It sparked off the revolutions of May 1941 and July 14th 1958. The revolutionary military platoons under the leadership of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party took a direct part in bringing down the dictatorial and deviationist regimes on February 8th 1963 and July 17th 1968.

The participation of the military in the various aspects of national action against dictatorial and client regimes was a positive sign in the Arab revolutionary movement. The Arab Ba'th Socialist

Party was at the forefront of political movements which worked in the ranks of the army in many Arab countries to enlist revolutionary men in addition to other revolutionary forces of workers and peasants in the service of Arab Unity, freedom and socialism.

The social structure of the army's base, belonging to peasants, workers and small bourgeoisie classes, together with the patriotic education of our army made it identify personally with the aspirations of the people and pushed many of its members to participate in the revolutionary struggle as happened in 1941, 1958, 1963 and 1968.

The participation of the army in politics, however, has not been all positive. In some cases it greatly harmed the interests of the people and their aspirations.

The army and its good reputation was used by the dictatorial and deviationist regime of Qassem to deprive the people of their democratic liberties and curtail the freedom of political organizations. A military aristocracy of elite officers took control of the State. They committed all kinds of oppression and exploitation against the people while retaining for themselves unlawful privileges. Their behaviour was widely resented by the wide base of the army which did not want to involve the army and its reputation in such exploitation.

This resentment was shared by other circles, which were not very different from the military aristocracy, for ulterior motives.

The Revolution of February 8th 1963, was infiltrated by rightist elements which helped in the implementation of the regressive move of November 18th 1963. It was against the ideology of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party from the beginning that such elements should be allowed to infiltrate the Revolution. The general conditions, however, called for the widest possible alliances in accordance with the concepts of a popular revolution.

The Novemberist regime was a clear example of the entrenchment in power of the military aristocracy who had no real roots in the army and with the people. They, therefore relied almost completely on personal, tribal and sectarian relationships. Their only standbys were the opportunists and the drop-outs of the nationalist movement.

The rightist military aristocracy which was influential during the Aref regime, tried again to infiltrate and take over the Revolution of July 17th as was explained by the statement of July 30th. But the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party was on the alert and was able to nip the attempt in the bud. The Party was able to forge the course of the Revolution according to national concepts of socialism and democracy with wide support from

the masses and the national army.

The Party and the Revolution were faced with two basic and urgent tasks: One, to consolidate the Party's leadership of the army by purging it of suspect elements, re-education and immunization against deviation and by insuring that it would always be completely identified with the popular movement under the leadership of the Party.

The Second task was to rebuild the army, re-train it and re-equip it along modern lines and to enlarge it so that it could carry out its duty in safeguarding the unity and territorial integrity of the country and in contributing to the national battle against the imperialist Zionist enemy.

The process was extremely delicate and complex but it was carried out with a high degree of success. It was easy to talk about the dissolution of the old army and the rebuilding of a new one. But it was easier said than done. The country was in a state of quasi-civil war. A large section of the army was concentrated in Jordan, while the state of the Arab Nation called for an increase of the Jordan garrison until it reached fifty thousand.

Before the end of the first year of the Revolution, the Iranian Government abolished the 1937 treaty and created thereby a new military threat on our eastern borders.

We must keep in mind that, in addition to these peculiar circumstances which needed the help of many sections of the army in spite of their not being absolutely identified with the aims of the Revolution, the nature of modern armies is vastly different from that at the beginning of this century. The building of a new army requires many years of training the officers and men to use modern complex equipment.

The relatively small size of Iraq, compared to the Soviet Union or China, is another very important consideration which had to be kept in mind in view of the advanced long range weapons of modern times. It was necessary therefore to adopt long range graduated plans in rebuilding the army. It was difficult to purge the army during the first few months of the Revolution in view of the pockets and cliques in the army which were not to be trusted. Patience and long term work within the ranks of the army produced an unprecedented success unequalled anywhere in the Arab World or in the Third World.

The Party organization entrusted with the work in the army did an excellent job under the supervision of the Party's leadership. Our military comrades demonstrated total loyalty to the Party, practiced the outmost discipline and spread traditions of subordination to the Party. Their



organizational and educational activities within army ranks made the Party organization within the army a vanguard which together with the other patriotic officers and soldiers form a strong arm and vigilant eye for the Revolution. .

On the other hand, great progress was achieved in rebuilding the army along modern lines. During the past few years, new methods of training have been introduced as well as new equipment and technological means. The combat efficacy of the army has been greatly enhanced. Our army now possesses one of the best fighting structures in the World. The formations and numbers have been greatly increased. The rate of development has been great. We are still, however, working continuously toward a better army. We can be proud today that our national army is capable of safeguarding the country and carrying out its tasks.

The Party started right from the beginning to build a special security branch which was called at first "the Public Relations Bureau" and later "the Department of General Intelligence".

Party control over the police and security was tightened by placing Party members and loyal nationalists in the sensitive posts and by re-organization and re-education in accordance with the concepts of the Revolution and the

requirements of the new phase.

The special security branch, composed of Party strugglers, was exemplary in efficiency, discipline and loyalty. It was meticulous in carrying out security missions ordered by the Party. Members of this branch had had little formal experience in this field of work except for some aspects of Party activity prior to the Revolution. But they were quick to learn and prove their high calibre by liquidating external and internal conspiracies and exposing intelligence networks.

The security force was inoculated on all levels by Party elements and other patriotic and qualified men. This force, however, was difficult to reform and rebuild because of its longstanding rotten structure. During the past few years, this force has reflected badly on the Party in many aspects. We must confess that the leadership was wrong in not tightening control further over this very important apparatus. The leadership had full confidence in the Party members in this force which caused some of them to abuse it and conspire against the Party as was shown in the June 30th criminal conspiracy. This conspiracy, however, sounded the alarm, and the leadership made extensive changes.

Some Party members in the security force and other independent patriotic elements did serve

and still are serving the Revolution and the Party.

The police force was one of the worst forms of government machinery during the previous regimes. The Revolution was careful to reform it and re-educate its members with new values and practices as well as infuse it with fresh blood. A significant improvement has been felt, but it is still needed to rebuild this force to the standard required by the Revolution.

On the whole, these three branches have made some strides on the lines of modern reorganization and in technical equipment. The security branch in our country can be said to have reached a good standard in counterespionage and safeguarding the stability of the country. This can be most effective with constant Party supervision.

The participation of some elements from the General Security in the abortive conspiracy of June 30th must not lead us to irrational reactions nor to placing less confidence in this apparatus, but should show us the importance of Party control and supervision. Otherwise, we would lose an eye which the Revolution and the people need in order to watch the movement of enemies.

**CHAPTER SEVEN**  
**CULTURAL AND SOCIAL**  
**TRANSFORMATIONS**



## **SECTION ONE REQUIREMENTS... AND INHERITED CONDITIONS**

Basic changes in the social, cultural, informational and educational fields as well as in legislation must be considered as important as the other national, democratic, socialist changes already mentioned and they must go hand in hand. The Revolution thus moves comprehensively towards building the national, democratic, socialist state.

The Revolution had inherited a worn-out bureaucratic machine in the state which had accumulated all the wrongs of Ottoman and British rule. The laws reflected vested interests. They were reactionary and at best reformative. But they were all out of touch with the spirit of modern times.

The culture and information machinery was no better, certainly no less backward, ideologically and technically. Education was chaotic and dominated by the ideologies of the rightists, reactionaries and opportunists.

Some changes were introduced into the structure and laws of the state and also into educational and cultural activities between July 14th 1958 and July 17th 1968. Some of the innovations were progressive. But the changes were sparse unrelated to an integrated whole and often emptied of meaning.

The Party had to face difficult missions in these fields. The objective conditions of the country and the area, in addition to the state of the Party itself made it necessary that the Party should take over power in a matter of hours without adequate preparation of a complete machinery as in the case of the other revolutions in the world, such as the Chinese Revolution. At the same time, the Revolution was unable to liquidate the old machinery and replace it with a new one, as did the Russian Revolution.

The balance of social forces which necessitated the aforementioned method in taking over power and the conditions peculiar to Iraq in addition to the nature of modern times and requirements make it impossible to paralyse the state machinery for even one day. Therefore, liquidation or instantaneous replacement would have led to chaos and great harm.

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the Revolution were thus compelled to keep the government

machinery going in spite of all the distortions and obstructions created by it, and to work gradually towards achieving the changes required.

It was a daily task requiring continuous effort in all ideological, political, administrative, organizational and technical fields. We must confess though that the success achieved during the past phase was not as great as it should have been in view of all the efforts of the leadership and the resources at the service of change.

The reason for not achieving the required results may have been corrected with the attitudes and practices of many who were placed in positions of responsibility and who were supposed to lead the process of transformation. Some of these tried unwisely to jump the requirements of time and effort thereby causing abortions. Others were too bureaucratic under the guise of objectivity and wisdom. They colonized the institutions just like the old guard without any enthusiasm and without making any new impression on the system. The chaotic, infantile and rash actions of 1963 may have this tendency to intentionally slow movement. This does not take into consideration, however, the change of circumstances and the new phase.





## **SECTION TWO**

### **THE COURSE OF CHANGE**

#### **1 — Culture and Information**

The field of information, and consequently culture, was the first to receive the attention of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party immediately following the 30th of July 1968. This field had to be guided in accordance with the requirements of the Revolution.

The information apparatus, in view of its sensitivity and close connection with the state and the masses, was under close daily supervision. It was important first that the apparatus should be well informed of the Party's plans in general and in detail so that it could act in a harmonious and purposeful manner. The leadership has made special efforts during the last few years on these lines by exerting direct supervision over the main information media and by putting at their disposal good material and manpower resources in order to make the media a creative and progressive sector and an active tool of the Party and the Revolution.

There is no doubt that many significant developments have taken place but mainly on the

technical side. The human revolutionary side has not been developed to meet the many complex requirements of the Revolution. There is still need for a good, responsible cadre of qualified personnel on all levels. Many rightist and unqualified elements with no creative instincts are still well-entrenched in the machinery. This is why creative and effective informational work which is supposed to express the ideas of the Party is still below standard.

## **2 — Education**

It is perhaps in education that the battle of transformation will be decisive. The Party has consistently therefore urged for better educational programmes on all levels from kindergarten through to university: programmes that would go hand in hand with the development programme both horizontally and in depth.

Large scale efforts have been made during the past few years in providing more schools, books and equipment. Some progress has been made in building and developing technical schools. The number of universities has been increased and the old ones have been expanded. Changes, however, have been principally in numbers and equipment, while the intellectual and educational aspect has received scant attention compared to the ambitions of the Revolution and the resources

that have been put at the disposal of the facility.

School programmes on all levels still fall short of expressing the principles of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the socialist and national revolution. They are still propagating bourgeois and liberal values. Also the universities are still full of liberal and rightist backward currents and are very far from being the universities of the Revolution which are supposed to take their new role in building the new society.

The necessity of changing the old educational programmes and paying great attention to technical education is still pressing urgently and delaying the development programme. Schools and universities are producing annually tens of thousands of students who are of no use to the industrial, agricultural and services programmes and development. The government finds it necessary to find jobs for these graduates in institutions which are already overstaffed. The institutions are suffering from disguised unemployment.

It can be said that the Revolution has not as yet got its own system of education capable of rearing the generation which is well educated in the principles of socialism and nationalism and which can fulfill the aims of the Party.

### **3 — Legislation**

Laws are but a reflection of the concepts and economic interests prevailing in society. The Laws inherited by the Revolution had been promulgated during the dictatorial and reactionary regimes expressing the interests of the ruling exploiting classes and their backward ideology. It was natural therefore that the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party which had waged comprehensive revolutionary struggle against past regimes should review the laws and make amendments.

The Revolutionary Command Council had to acquire the highest legislative power in the country in order to be able to manage such an achievement. This was an important and decisive step. But it was not enough so long as the bulk of the laws in force were still inherited from previous regimes. A state of conflict still exists, with some laws reflecting the values and interests of the Revolution while the rest express previous interests and values against which the Party has been fighting.

The Leadership of the Party and the Revolution took direct initiatives to change many laws in order to institute reform such as the laws of agricultural reform and the labour laws. Many committees were formed for such purposes. But the bulk and essential structure of the laws remained unchanged. So did many of the instruments of justice.

The legal paradox cannot remain any longer.

It is unthinkable that the laws and concepts against which the Party and the Revolution worked should remain unchanged. The present phase requires a complete revision of all existing Iraqi laws to make them in line with the principles of the Revolution and the laws and orders issued by the Revolutionary Command Council.

It is important to remember that our criticism of the existing laws does not urge their violation in daily life but rather their change through the proper revolutionary channels.

#### **4 — Women:**

The liberation of the Arab Woman and her release from her antiquated economic, social and legal bonds is one of the main aims of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. For without such a liberation, the Arab woman would not be able to participate fully in society as an economic and legal equal to the man.

The Party must therefore work tirelessly towards legal equality and the provision of equal opportunities of work. It is the duty of the Party and its organizations to fight against all the backward concepts which relegate the role of women to a marginal and secondary place. Such concepts conflict with our Arab and Islamic heritage and are in fact alien and harmful. They also conflict

with the values and concepts of the Party, the Revolution and the needs of modern times. The liberation of women cannot be done through women's societies alone. It can be done through the complete political and economic liberation of society. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party has a leading role to play in the liberation of women since it leads the process of social and cultural change.

### **5 — Literacy:**

A high percentage of our people, especially in the countryside, are illiterate. It goes without saying that such a state of affairs does not help in the least in making all the progress that is needed in the country while the vast majority are illiterate.

Persistent efforts have been made under the Revolution in the field of adult education by the State and popular organizations. Many centers of adult education have been opened by the Ministry of education, unions and other organizations in cities and villages. The armed forces have played an important role in this respect. The government has created many incentives requiring all employees to read and write. Adult education has not yet become the national campaign which it should, without acquiring the proportion of a national campaign, adult education cannot achieve the total result required.

We must realize that without the full application of compulsory elementary education, great numbers of illiterates will keep flowing on every year. We must measure accurately the ratio of adult education to the number of illiterates produced each year. If the ratio is small, it means that we have not done very much to wipe out illiteracy. We have been merely lessening its bad effects. If so, then we must work on a completely different level. Experience, however, has shown that classical methods of adult education cannot produce much. No less than a national campaign under the leadership of the Party and the government is required.

## **6 — Youth:**

The question of youth does not involve their mere organization into sports and clubs. For young people can play a vital role in the process of socialist transformation. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party should harness youth and lead it to fulfill its role in the democratic participation of the people. Negligence in this respect will only weaken the capacity of the nation to rise to the challenge posed by the imperialist and Zionist enemy.

Today, we must confess that this question has been neglected for far too long. The Youth Organization has been set up only recently and the vast majority of young people are still outside its bounds, vulnerable to harmful and wasteful currents of



thought and activity. While it is true that the number of youth clubs has increased and the facilities put at their disposal have been enhanced and developed, the achievement is still short of the ambition. The matter of organizing young people in the service of the socialist and national revolution is still in its infancy.

### **7 — New Values and Practices in the Revolutionary Society.**

In the days of imperialist rule, reaction and dictatorship, many harmful values and practices were left to grow and spread in society. There was a negative feeling of citizenship and responsibility. Team and social work was not a common value. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party was aware of these harmful values which could only be ascribed to the corrupt regime. Even since its inception, the Party has fought against such values and tried to replace them with good citizenship, selfless service and national loyalty. This has been both the spiritual resource of the Party in its continuous struggle and its ability to lead the masses.

The Party is therefore required to spread these values, and fight the harmful pre-revolutionary values. The mission, of course, is not easy and simple. It requires a generation of time and ceaseless work to achieve full results. The work will also depend on the Party and its leadership in setting

the example and leading all the institutions and organizations we have mentioned in the right direction.

The Party must, however, work ceaselessly and conscientiously from the beginning. The Party must encourage a love of collective work, voluntary service and enthusiasm. Such values have been encouraged by the Party in popular work. Wide campaigns of work in agriculture and services had been underway to produce quick results.

There has been a great deal of criticism of such campaigns by the reactionaries and disgruntled elements. But the experiment has proved positive especially after the participation of the Party's higher echelons together with the popular organizations. Good experience in this field has been gained and many faults have been eradicated. The experiment in 1973 was a summer work camp in Abu Munaisir and it was most successful. In addition to its educational and spiritual benefit it has had its economic uses.

Another important aspect of youth and mass activities has been military training which has helped organize a reserve army which can be used to defend the country and the Revolution. Even though the experiment was not on a large scale, as it should have been, it proved its worth in propagating the new values. Such an experiment

should be further developed and expanded.

What the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party has been able to achieve in the field of education, information, culture, popular work camps and military training can serve to show the new values of the Party rule. The size and scope has yet to be increased, but it has shown what missions are awaiting us and in what fields. The close relationship between progress in such fields and other political spheres cannot be too greatly emphasized. Each step in this field will help other steps in other fields. The battle of oil nationalization is an example. The enthusiasm generated by the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party among the people during the battle of nationalization was a further encouraging factor in its decision to nationalize and in the success of the battle. When triumph finally came in March 1973, the income cuts were returned to the people as promised by the Revolution. The result was a great trust in the revolutionary leadership which furnishes the ground to win national battles in the future.



## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **NATIONAL TASKS**



## **SECTION ONE**

### **REGIONAL AND NATIONAL TASKS**

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party is the Party of Arab National Revolution. It struggles for Arab nationalism under one national Pan-Arab leadership. Its division into regional organizations is an outcome of political division in the Arab Nation. The division of the Party will pass with the removal of the imposed division in the Arab Countries.

The Party's struggle, regardless of its place in relation to political power, is always in the direction of the aims of Arab revolution of unity, freedom and socialism.

The conditions of division in the Arab Nation are now political, economic and psychological. The Arab revolution, because of such conditions, has embarked upon a peculiar road which is to work within the existing political boundaries while working at the same time to meet the pre-requisites of national integration. The other way would have been different. It would have entailed taking control in one country and moving forward to other

countries until the establishment of the single Arab state was achieved. In the view of the Ba'th Party, both roads would lead to the same end namely the establishment of the unified democratic socialist Arab State.

Theoretically and practically, the basis for Party rule in any single Arab country is for the purpose of building a base for national struggle. The development of the regional state would be put in the service of building the national state through the organizational and conceptual unity of the Party and through its united political programme.

Thus, the revolution of the Party in any single Arab state has twin aspects. One is regional and the other is national. The two aspects are inter-related and dialectically connected. They pour into a single stream. The Party is the centrifugal force of coordination and direction.

The failure of a single base of national struggle is not a failure in a region only: it also affects the whole of the national struggle. The Party and all Arab revolutionaries are thus called upon to safeguard the base to enable it to overcome its own difficulties especially in the first stages which would eventually give the Party more freedom to act nationally. Any national gains and achievements also help the Party locally and give it more



momentum.

It is wrong to suppose that hard and fast lines can be drawn between the regional and national tasks. Likewise, it would be wrong to draw hard and fast lines between regional and national priorities during a single phase especially in the first stages of the Revolution. For regional achievements are but a bridge for national ones. Without regional success, national work would be impossible.

Putting the regional above the national may lead to statism and placing the national over the regional may lead to rash and childish action. The Party must be alert and vigilant and must maintain a constant balance.

The bulk of the party's regional achievements in Iraq after the Revolution of July 17-30th 1968 have helped to a great extent in exerting a favorable influence over the national struggle. These included: the consolidation of the Revolution's authority and Party's leadership; complete realization of political and economic independence particularly the nationalization of Iraq Petroleum Company; the democratic transformation as expressed prominently in the peaceful solution of the Kurdish problem and the establishment of the progressive front. Such great strides have considerably strengthened the revo-

establishment of the national and progressive front. Such great strides have considerably strengthened the revolutionary base in Iraq and made it a centre of gravity and diffusion in the area.

We must remember that the Revolution in Iraq still has many regional tasks to be achieved before it can play its full role in the national field. On the other hand, all that has been achieved in Iraq during the past five and a half years is only a beginning of things to come. For Iraq the task ahead is still colossal.



## SECTION TWO

### THE PALESTINE ISSUE

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, ever since its inception, and throughout its development has considered the Palestine cause as central to the whole Arab struggle and closely related to the national struggle for freedom, unity and socialism.

The Palestine issue, since the escalation of Zionist aggressive ambitions and the establishment of the Zionist state in 1948 has been the prime Arab cause responsible for all the changes and developments in the Arab East.

After the Arab defeat of June 1967 and the Zionist occupation of more lands belonging to Syria and Egypt, the importance and significance of the Palestine issue had increased manifold. The Zionist imperialist danger to the whole existence of the Arab nation and its future has been clearly shown.

It was natural, therefore, that the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party should be almost completely preoccupied with the Palestine cause and

its challenges, together with the requirements to meet the challenge.

The period between the defeat and the Revolution in July 17th 1968 was not enough to prepare a complete theoretical and practical programme of action. The Ninth National Congress of the Party in March 1968 drew correct lines of guidance.

The Party's view of the Palestine cause, the circumstances of its pre-revolution struggle, the state of dissention created by the February 1966 reaction and its isolation from direct participation in the Palestine Resistance Movement with all its political, organizational and psychological effects, made the Party produce the most comprehensive slogans and programmes for the new phase of struggle, to face the Zionist imperialist aggression.

Most of those slogans and programmes were correct theoretically such as the rejection of old defeatist solutions, denunciation of the Arab regimes responsible for the defeat and the call for a protracted popular war. We must confess, and this is very significant, that the gap was great between our slogans and our ability to translate those slogans into practical action. During that phase, our Party was besieged and was unable to play a leading role in the arena of Arab

When the Party came to power in Iraq after the Revolution of July 17th 1968, it suddenly occupied the limelight and was called upon to put all its programmes and slogans into immediate action.

The urgent pleas came from many sides: from the base of the Party and its organizations, from the masses and from the Palestine Resistance Movement some of whose sections had negative old relations with the Party. Not only were those circles pressing the Party hard for action, but many suspect elements were doing the same in order to embarrass the Party.

The Party, under those difficult circumstances, did not want to be rushed without careful consideration of an accurate balance between slogans, long-range strategy and its real ability to meet the requirements.

The two most important errors committed by the Party and the Revolution in their performance of national duties towards the Palestine cause until the events of September 1970 in Jordan were these: That the promises of the Party and its commitments toward the Palestine cause were much bigger than its ability to fulfill. The second error lay in the lack of understanding of the dialectical relationship between the regional and national tasks after the Party takes over

control in any single country. The bitter experience of September 1970 was the net result of these errors.

Before those events, the Party had gone into the national arena with the Palestine cause in a way far beyond its capabilities in that phase, and before being able to settle decisively the regional tasks which would enable it to play the national role. The authority of the Revolution had to be consolidated and the Kurdish Question had to be solved before the military resources of Iraq could be released. The Party made major promises for temporary psychological gains without considering that the development of events might compel it to fulfill those promises.

Iraq at that time had over fifty thousand soldiers on the Eastern front ( Jordan and Syria ). It was fully participating in all Arab official activities, military and political, in facing the enemy. Iraq had always taken the hard line in all issues without meticulous calculation of the consequences and the resources available. The Party and the Revolution in short put themselves on the crest of the wave.

When the Jordanian regime ruthlessly embarked upon the liquidation of the Palestinian Resistance, putting to the test all the slogans, the Party and the Revolution found themselves

unable to deal in a way commensurate with the size and extent of the conspiracy and with the aforementioned promises.

This created a highly sensitive situation within the Party itself. Some comrades were of the opinion that everything must be thrown into the field on the assumption that this would put the Party at the head of the masses and engender fresh additional forces. These comrades neglected some military and political considerations and neglected the importance of keeping a national base of struggle, safe for retreat as well as for future initiatives. Others called for retreat and the guarding of the Revolution regardless of any losses on the national front.

The events of September 1970 cast a heavy shadow over the following phase. It was widely exploited by the forces of opposition. The reputation of the Party suffered immensely among the Arab masses and in Arab and foreign political circles. For some time, the Party was isolated and unable to make any move among the Arab masses. Its relations with some Resistance circles deteriorated.

The sincerity and vitality of the Party, however, enabled it to pick up again and overcome the difficult period by positive work on the Arab level. The Party and the Revolution have since



been able to return to the fore as an effective and leading force. During the last three years, between September 1972 and October 6th 1973, many facts about the Arab situation have been revealed and many deceptions have been unmasked to prove that the Party's stances and analysis of events were basically correct on many issues.

The escalation of the revolutionary achievements in Iraq such as nationalization of oil, the establishment of the national progressive front, the success in formulating a correct framework for friendly relations with the Soviet Union and progressive forces in the world, presented Iraq as a strong base for Arab struggle and an example to be followed.

The wise and flexible way, far from verbal competition, has regained the confidence of the Arab masses and improved relations with some Arab regimes, making the Party's position more respected and to be used as a central guide by some progressive Arab circles.

The Party's initiative in 1972 in proposing a fighting union with Syria and Egypt and in treating relations with them in a constructive spirit did much to produce good results.

The Party's slogan's and programmes for using oil as a political weapon in battle, particularly after successful nationalization have made

our slogans central in the Arab World.

Iraq's quick and decisive participation in the October 1973 war and its blow to American and Dutch interests, its rejection of the ceasefire and the new liquidatory solutions put the Party in this country in a distinguished and leading position against Zionism, imperialism and reactionary connivance.

Attempts to isolate our Party and Revolution at present are different from those in the past. They are now directed rather at containment of our effect on the Arab scene. Our task is to gain the full support and understanding of the Arab masses and revolutionary forces throughout the Arab World.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **THE ARABIAN GULF... ARABIAN PENINSULA AND THE RED SEA**

The Arabian Gulf area remained until recently under direct British imperialist domination. Because of the large area, sparse population and position on the maritime commercial route it remained open to foreign immigration both organized and unorganized.

After the discovery of oil in the area in huge quantities, the demographic factor, rather than the military importance of the area, started to figure prominently in British and American plans for the area. In order to keep their control over the area, the British and Americans adopted long range plans. In addition to possessing the loyalty of the local sheikhs and direct control over all facilities, they began organizing foreign immigration especially of Iranians. The aim was to change the Arab national character of the area in a way similar to what happened in Palestine. In their view, this would be sufficient to isolate the area from its Arab milieu and thus prevent its liberation and integration with the neighbour-

ring Arab states and with Iraq in particular.

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party was the first since the early sixties to warn of the dangers in the Gulf area. We understood that the essential character of the conflict would be national, and compared its beginnings to the beginnings of the conflict in Palestine.

During the sixties, the British and Americans exerted great effort to make new arrangements in the Gulf which had a superficial appearance of a British military withdrawal and independence for the existing small entities, while in effect it meant a tightening of the imperialist political, economic and military control of the area.

The Arab Gulf question, though characterized by the national nature of the conflict because of the Iranian Government's ambitions, is part and parcel of the Arab cause and is closely connected with the struggle for liberation, unity and progress.

The Gulf area, including Iran, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula contains the largest oil reserves in the whole world. This fact, coupled with the energy crisis, made this area one of the most important and most sensitive for the imperialists.

The oil in this area ceased to be merely a good ground for investment: it became also a great strategic matter, closely connected with

the imperialist interests and position in the international conflict. The future of the western world and Japan depends on oil. The renewal of arrangement in this area and the whole Arab World

has become vitally important for American imperialism. Great efforts and new, immense political, economic and military resources are being used by the Americans to secure this area. It is no longer possible to isolate the events in this area from the events of the Arab Nation. It is also no longer possible to deal with the events and conflicts of this area on a regional basis in spite of the peculiarities that characterize that area

The imperialist attempt to change the national character of the Arab Gulf is linked closely to the plan for securing energy and guarding its transportation via the Gulf, Red Sea and the Mediterranean. All the puppets and agents of the imperialists in the area, play their role in the service of these aims, in spite of their contradictions and conflicts, because of American imperialist coordination.

Lines of transport and communication are as basic as the oil itself. Therefore the roles of the agents of imperialism are not confined to keeping oil contracts and protecting loyal regimes

against change and the winds of nationalization, but also to securing the lines of transportation and communication by isolating the revolutionary spots especially in Iraq and containment of south Yemen in order to topple their regimes. North Yemen is also being subjected to attempts to reinstate reactionary and imperialist control. North and South Yemen occupy a strategic position on the southern coast of the Red Sea. The imperialist plan also calls for keeping the situation in the Sudan under control, isolating the Eritrean revolution and keeping Djibouti port under Ethiopia. Such an operation of course requires dense military armaments in sea, land and air and also large budgets for propaganda, agents and military coups.

The operation is also connected with the Palestine cause or the so-called Middle East crisis. All the parties mentioned are working in accordance with a general plan which aims at striking at the Arab revolution by encirclement, domestication, penetration and finally its defeat. The aim is to impose an American solution on the area.

By the time the Iraqi Revolution of July 17th 1968 took place, the American plans in the Gulf area made significant strides by gaining time and in preparing resources before the Revo-

lution could face its responsibilities in the area. The Revolution through five and a half years of its life had to face the following conditions and considerations.

1 — The Party was preoccupied in the beginning with the task of consolidating the Revolution and was thus unable to invest effort sufficient to affect the fortunes of the area.

2 — Iraq had been absent from the area because of imperialist schemes and the policies of the previous regimes. Iraq had to start building political, cultural and economic relations virtually from scratch.

3 — It was difficult to build close links with the area because of the weakness of its popular movement and the incapacity of the local governments to respond to the dangers. The Iraqi initiatives were pictured by the imperialists as dangerous so as to isolate them from the support of the big neighbouring Arab State.

4 — The imperialist force in the Gulf area increased and accelerated at a time when Iraq was preoccupied politically, and militarily with the Palestine cause and the requirements of facing the imperialist Zionist enemy. This affected the size and quality of the Revolution's effort in the Gulf

All this took place also in the shadow of a

suspect Arab silence which may have been due in part to preoccupation with the conflict of Palestine. Certain regimes turned a deaf ear to the pleadings of Iraq concerning dangers in the Gulf. They declined any commitments, even moral and symbolic, and went as far as improving its relations with Iran before and after the Iranian occupation of the three Arab islands of Abu Musa and two Tunbs.

The alliance of such regimes with the Saudi regime, which plays an essential role in the imperialist plan, gave the reactionary Saudi regime a political cover to influence the Gulf in cooperation with Iran.

Other Arab regimes were negligent and unable to play an effective role in protecting the Gulf. Some of them accused Iraq of trying to dodge its commitments to the Palestine cause by diverting attention to the Gulf.

The responsibility of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party towards the Arab Gulf springs first and foremost from its national principles and aims. Iraq, being the largest Arab country in the area and the most advanced, carries the main burden in safeguarding the area. The national importance of the area cannot be overemphasized, and the dangers facing it are serious.





## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **ARAB RELATIONS**

The main efforts of the Party and the Revolution have been centred around the Palestine cause and the Gulf. Relations with the Arab countries, on both the popular and official levels, have been determined to large extent by these two interrelated cases.

There are of course other factors and fields of activity which are essentially important in Arab relations such as economic, cultural and human relations which provide the substructural base for Arab unity. But most of the Arab countries are occupied with political problems. The Party and the Revolution have used all possible means to transcend political circumstances by strengthening relations with Arab countries and the masses in all parts of the Arab Homeland.

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the Revolution carry the main responsibility in the struggle for Arab unity on all levels and in all fields of endeavour. We are called upon to make all possible progress in any of these fields.

**SECTION NINE**

**INTERNATIONAL POLICY**



The main considerations that determine the foreign policy of the Revolution on the international plane are:

1 — The requirements of Arab liberation causes particularly those of Palestine and the Arab Gulf.

2 — The necessity of safeguarding the Revolution in Iraq which is a base of struggle for unity, freedom and socialism.

3 — Belief in the Arab revolutionary movement as being part of the world revolution and the necessity of alliance between both in struggling against imperialism, aggression and racial discrimination for the sake of freedom, peace and progress in the world, with care to safeguard the independence and distinguishing features of the Arab revolutionary movement.

4 — Belief in the necessity of establishing good relations with the Arab people in all fields, within the framework of our interests and national needs, and in accordance with our principles of fraternity and cooperation among peoples.

In the light of these considerations, efforts have been made during the past few years to establish relations with various countries.

## IRAQ'S NEIGHBOURS

Special effort have been made with the neighbouring and proximate countries in view of historical ties and mutual interests and aspirations.

The Revolution has been careful to establish good neighbourly relations with Turkey. Mutual visits of significance have been made by leaders of both countries. In 1972, the Regional Secretary General of the Party and President of the Republic Comrade Ahmad Hassan Al-Bakr made a visit to Turkey which further strengthened the ties of friendship between the two countries and opened new vistas for continuous cooperation.

The Revolution has also taken care to establish strong relations with Afghanistan to which we are attached by strong historical ties of friendship. Over the past few years, our relations with Afghanistan have developed significantly and opened up new horizons for continued cooperation.

The Revolution has paid attention to establishing good relations with Pakistan in view of historical ties and Pakistan's stand, distinguished amongst all the Islamic countries, towards Palestine. The conditions for better relations were not sufficient. In spite of this fact, relations

between the two countries have been progressing normally.

Relations with India have progressed quickly to embrace many vital fields, especially the economic and technical. India is Iraq's largest Asiatic neighbour. The two countries are linked by strong historical ties. They see eye to eye generally in their basic political views particularly in the struggle against imperialism and adherence to nonalignment. These factors form a strong base for developing the relations between the two countries in their mutual interests and the interests of peace and the struggle against imperialism in this important area of the world.

Relations with neighbouring Iran, on the other hand, have been marked, in the last years, by negativism and tension as a result of Iran's unfriendly attitude towards Iraq, characterized by the unilateral abolition of the 1937 treaty and creation of border problems and intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq.

While the Revolution has declared its determination to safeguard the legitimate rights of Iraq, it has been careful also to try and establish good neighbourly relations with Iran on a just basis, with mutual respect for the integrity of both countries and in harmony with historical ties and mutual interest.

The Revolution has taken special care and all requisite steps to try and solve the problems with Iran peacefully. The latest step was the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and called upon Iran to open negotiations towards such a solution.



## **RELATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.**

Relations with the socialist countries and the Soviet Union occupy an advanced and special position in our foreign relations particularly after the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of April 9th 1972. In one way or another, these relations are linked with the four principal considerations mentioned previously.

The pan-Arab national nature of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, and the nature of its wide-reaching revolutionary tasks to achieve unity freedom and socialism, require a protracted and difficult struggle fraught with hazards. The burden of such a struggle falls first and foremost on our Party, the people and all national and progressive forces.

But since our struggle is directed mainly against certain international forces with immense military, political and economic resources, these being imperialism, Zionism and their local allies, the prevailing conditions and the balance of power give our struggle for our three strategic objectives its particular national nature. For these reasons, alliance with other international forces with comparable military, economic and

political resources, which are closer to our principles, aims and interests is a correct move. It is indeed vital, on the condition that we preserve the independence and free will of our Arab revolution together with its special characteristics.

The Soviet Union and the socialist countries are closest to us of the strong and advanced countries. This is in spite of differences of opinion on many matters. They are closest to us in principles, aims and interests. In addition to this, the human experience of struggle has proved undoubtedly that the movements of all peoples for freedom and progress meet in the framework of the world revolutionary movement in spite of the special characteristics of each movement.

Our Revolution must therefore converge with that of the Soviet Union and Socialist countries, the largest forces of the world revolution, since we are all a part of the same whole. The alliance of revolutions is natural. Therefore the slogan raised by the Arab Socialist Party and the Revolution of July 17th for strategic alliance with Soviet Union and the Socialist countries is correct in principle and in practice. It is in harmony with the principles of our Party and its aspirations to unity, freedom and socialism. It is also in harmony with the interest and aspira-

tions of the Arab nation and the struggle for liberation and progress.

Cooperation between Iraq and other progressive Arab countries on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and the socialist countries on the other, hold a special importance in the fields of armament and development. Armament in our country and other Arab progressive countries is necessary to confront the imperialist Zionist aggression, and to liberate our usurped land in Palestine. It is natural, therefore, that we should turn in this respect mainly to the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries. Our economic independence also runs counter to the interests of imperialism. . The experiences of the Arab struggle during the last two decades, from the break-up of the arms monopoly in 1955 to the October war of 1973, proves the correctness of this line of action.

In Iraq, the 1959 agreement on economic and technical cooperation with the Soviet Union contributed to the expansion of the industrial infrastructure in Iraq. Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the socialist countries on the one hand and our country on the other, had the greatest effect, after the July 17th Revolution in the field of national operation of oil and sulfur, in providing the material structures and exper-

tise to confront the monopolies and achieve economic independence. Cooperation in industry, large scale irrigation and other fields have helped to further the country's growth.

The mutual endeavour of our country and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in all fields of cooperation has been built on principles and interests. There is a general convergence of ideas between the Arab revolutionary movement, of which we are a part, and the Soviet Union and socialist countries. Likewise, the two parties have an interest in cooperation.

During the last few years, the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the Revolution of July 17th have been able to build relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries on a strong and correct basis. It can be said that our relations are ideal and hitherto unequalled in containing the basic requirements for continuity and mutual interests.

The visits of leaders of our country and the Soviet Union particularly those of the Regional Secretary General and his deputy to Moscow and Premier Kosygin to Baghdad were marked by utter frankness, reliance on principles and realistic approaches. This has led to a high degree of understanding between the leaders of the two countries. The visit of the Regional Secretary

General to Bulgaria and Poland as well has had a great effect in consolidating this highly principled and practical line.

At the same time, the Party and the revolutionary government have taken care to establish cordial relations with the People's Republic of China. Visits on many levels have been exchanged and many economic, commercial and technical agreements have been signed. A great deal of scope for continued cooperation between the two countries still exists so that cooperation covers various fields. This is important in supporting the mutual fight against imperialism and in benefiting the countries of the Third World whose conditions are similar in the struggle for liberation and social progress.

## **RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND JAPAN**

The struggle of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the people meets with stiff resistance from the imperialist countries which try to block our way to the realization of our national aspirations: unity, freedom and socialism.

Our relations with these countries have been therefore characterized mainly by struggle against

their imperialist policies, and imperialist influence on all planes and by all means, political and economic.

The following are the guidelines which define our relations with these countries:

1 — What we mean by imperialist countries are the U.S.A. in particular and those countries in cooperation with U.S. policies of aggression.

2 — The contradiction between us and these countries particularly the U.S. is vital, It is acute and far-reaching, and cannot be resolved without essential changes in the policies and attitudes of these countries towards us. We must study carefully any change in the policy of any of these countries and define our stance accordingly.

3 — The struggle against the imperialist countries takes many forms: political, intellectual and informational, and sometimes it takes the form of armed struggle. The economic struggle occupies a central position in the liquidation of their interests. We must practice all these means, according to circumstances, phases and resources.

4 — International relations are based realistic and nonemotional. Our opposition to the imperialist countries does not prevent us from

dealing with them in matters which are in our national interests. This is inevitable in international relations. But we must always warn the masses on anything connected with imperialism; for the bourgeoisie are still among us and so also are the forces of regression. They will try to manipulate any of our relations with the imperialists to promote their ideas and spread propaganda against our socialist system and our alliance with the socialist world. We must be vigilant and decisive. We must not hesitate to hit hard when necessary and educate the masses so as to establish firmly our socialist line.

5 — The western capitalist world is not composed totally of enemies and imperialists. Some countries take relatively moderate stands toward the Arabs. Some other countries are not in conflict with us thus making it possible to establish normal relations with them. Our independent attitudes and the requirements of modern times call for good relations with all peoples and countries. This can help us to benefit from their technological and scientific advances. and at the same time it can help strengthen our position internationally.

We must, however, be aware of many considerations in dealing with these countries. For these countries are not identical in their policies

vis-a-vis some aspects of the Arab cause. They have interests intertwined with those of the U.S. and other imperialist countries and some of them are under strong Zionist influence in the political, social and economic fields. We must consider each case on its own merits and make an accurate estimation of each case of cooperation in order to block any infiltration of imperialist or Zionist influence. We must also consider the possibilities of the disengagement of some of these countries from the U.S. or of the weakening of relations at least, because of the ever-increasing call for the independence of Europe and also the need for oil. The U.S. is trying to secure control of Middle East oil, not merely for its own present and future needs but to keep Europe under its control also. We must take advantage of the underlying struggle between Europe and America and of the open conflict in the interest of our national struggle.

6 — It is necessary to pay attention to economic and technical relations with Japan. It is true that Japan is closely connected to the U.S., but the basic character of Japan's relations with the world is commercial. Japan consumes immense quantities of energy. It is a very advanced country in industry and technology. Cooperation with Japan would therefore be very



useful and not out of line with our anti-imperialist cause.

## **THE THREE CONTINENTS AND NONALIGNMENT**

Our Arab Homeland belongs to the so-called Third World of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Most of these countries have many things in common. They have all been in one way or another under imperialist domination. They struggle for Liberation, progress, national resurgence and unity just as the Arab nation has. They have all suffered from the problems of backwardness in the economic, social and cultural fields. In their common march against imperialism, a common language has been developed along with common fraternal ties. The movement of positive neutrality and nonalignment from Bandung Conference in 1955 until the Conference of Algiers 1973 has expressed the general framework of this grouping. Organizations such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity and the Organization of the Three Continents and other sub-organizations have been formed.

Our relation with these countries and our view of nonalignment are guided by the following pointers:

A — Our Arab Homeland extends across two continents. It is therefore vital and necessary that we have the strongest relations in all fields with our neighbours and the countries of these continents: such relations have existed in the past and they are indispensable in modern times.

B — Similarity of conditions and objectives of these countries makes it inevitable that they should establish solidarity in their common struggle to liquidate imperialism in both its old and new forms, and in achieving social progress and a new balance of power in the world, with new relations that recognize these countries' place in the world and strengthen peace.

C — The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, since its establishment, has emphasized the policy of positive neutrality and nonalignment as basic to its international relations. But it has stressed resolutely, in principle, the progressive and democratic content of this policy against imperialism and the policies of satellites in discriminating between nations. The policy of Iraq derives from this principle in its relations with its neighbours and other countries in the Third World.

Iraq has therefore tried to establish good relations with all these countries, especially with

progressive ones in Asia, Africa and Latin America. During the last few years, Iraq's relations with many African countries have expanded and developed. Visits have exchanged on many planes. Iraq has played host to the presidents of Somalia Central Africa and Chad. Economic and cultural agreements have been signed with these countries where by Iraq has extended economic and financial assistance.

Diplomatic relations were established for the first time with Cuba, Brazil and Venezuela and visits with these countries have been exchanged. The Prime Minister of Cuba has visited Iraq. Economic relations, particularly in the field of oil, have been established with Brazil.

The Revolution has done everything to further consolidate and strengthen the world's non-alignment movement. It has participated in the preliminary meeting of conferences and it took part in the last conference held in Algiers in 1973, stressing our principled stance vis-à-vis all the main issues of the conference.

We must confess that the steps taken in the field of relations with the Third World fall short of our ambition. Iraq, by virtue of the leadership of the Party, must play a leading role among the countries of the three continents, not only

in representing itself but also as the shining example of the Arab revolutionary movement and its principal tenets.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Struggle inside an international organization is important for any people fighting for its freedom and proper place in the international community. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party has always believed that the proper place of struggle for freedom lies in the homeland itself and that the real results come from such a struggle and not from resolutions passed by international organizations. It would be wrong however to underestimate the importance of such organizations.

We must follow a wise and balanced policy in this respect. An active presence in the international organizations are no alternative to fighting on the real battlefield with our own resources. But we must neither shirk the responsibility of presence and struggle in such organizations nor neglect the importance of resolutions won for our national causes.

The most important of international organizations in the United Nations and its

specialized agencies. All countries in the world are eager to take an active part in the U.N., to win support for their foreign policies, and to benefit from any possible technical and economic assistance. During the last few years, we have not neglected the U.N., but our efforts have not lived up to our ambitions.

Our rejection of resolution No. 242 for 1967 has limited our political movement within the framework of the so-called Middle East crisis. But this must not stand in the way of our participation in all fields of U.N. activities where we can make our views plain within the framework of coordination and cooperation with other Arab countries. There are other organizations outside the official and government plane, such as the World Peace Movement, Afro-Asian Solidarity, and world labour and professional federations. These play an important role in influencing world public opinion. We can say that our activities in such organizations over the past several years, particularly during the battle for nationalization, have been positive. Iraq has held a prominent position in many activities of such organizations, some of which have been held in Baghdad.

**PART TWO**

**THE TASKS OF  
THE NEXT PHASE**



## INTRODUCTION

In his address to the people on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Revolution, Comrade Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Regional Secretary General of the party and President of the republic said: « Your great revolution of July 17th 1968 under the leadership of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party now completes with great confidence and high resolution, its fifth year. It is entering its sixth year with greater confidence and firmer resolution. On this historic day it is worth our while to review critically and objectively the progress of the last five years, to re-evaluate our achievements with a revolutionary and integrity and draw the proper conclusions from triumphs and failures which we must bear in mind in our march to progress».

The first part of our report has defined the past phase of the Revolution's march in the spirit of the Comrade Regional Secretary's General historical speech of July 16th 1973. Great historical significance is attached to the revolution of the facts hitherto unpublicized. But of greater significance still is the learning of lessons relevant to our future.



We must be in possession of a clear revolutionary sight and more positive experience for our future course.

While the past phase has been full of difficult tasks and hazards, the next phase covering the five years between this conference and the next regional one, will certainly be full of difficult and sensitive missions as well as hazards and risks. There are three reasons for this:

A) The cause of the Revolution is composed of many interrelated links each of which will be wider and more difficult than the previous one. The fields of struggle will be wider and more hazardous.

B) The nature of Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and its comprehensive national missions bring it face to face with more responsibilities and risks, as it acquires more power and experience. Success in the past phase does not diminish or facilitate our tasks in the coming phase. On the contrary they will increase.

C) The imperialist and reactionary enemies who may have in the past underestimated the Party and its impact will now recognise the importance of our Party, the Revolution and the organized masses. Their methods and means in the past will not remain unchanged. The

quality and size of their counter measures have already altered which means that we will face more risks over the next five years.

We must repeat what we have already said in this report, that after five and a half years in power and acquaintance with the problems of revolutionary transformation, we must know exactly where we stand and define exactly our mission and tasks during the next five years. Lack of experience will be no longer a justification for us or for the Arab masses' view of our Revolution.

We can now safely say that the next five-year phase will require the following central needs;

1 — Consolidation of the unity of the Party regionally and nationally and the increase of its effectiveness in the Arab arena and in leading the Arab masses.

2 — Raising the intellectual, practical and organizational standard of the party leadership, members and all its organizations, and expanding leadership responsibility in the Party.

3 — Development and expansion of ideological activity in all fields as a central activity in the Party and a main precondition for party work and promotion. Great care must be taken to

safeguard ideological unity in Party ranks.

4 — Strengthening of the progressive national front and developing its activities in all fields together with the strengthening of frontal relations between the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the other parties of the front. This is in addition to adherence to the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question, including the comprehensive application of the March Declaration and the realization of self-rule in the time announced so that Kurdish masses will act within the framework of a democracy and a united homeland. The Northern district must be developed economically, socially and culturally swiftly and in an exceptional manner. The gains and rights of the national fraternal minorities must be preserved and developed in the direction of national unity and democratic and progressive development.

5 — Reliance on serious planning and programming in all fields of action in the Party, government and popular organization is essential.

6 — Care must be taken to achieve balance and coordination in the economic, social and cultural transformation to avoid time lags and gaps. Additional efforts must be expanded to coordinate development and then move in the

direction of the strategic aims of the Revolution.

7 — The economic, social and cultural transformation must be deepened and further accelerated to build the material and moral bases necessary for the transition to a socialist society.

8 — Meticulous balance must be achieved between the preservation of the revolutionary base in Iraq, carrying out the revolutionary tasks regionally and the national tasks. In this respect, errors must not be repeated and the appropriate lessons must be learnt.

9 — The realistic revolutionary method which produced so much should be preserved while developing it more creatively and by accelerating the pace of transformation.

10 — Re-establishment of balance between centralism and democracy in the Party, government and popular organizations, according to a gradual and safe procedure.

11 — We must bear in mind that some of the emergency measures which might be allowed to drop can be reactivated instantly under certain circumstances. New innovative measures can take place to suit the circumstances of the new phase. Care must be taken not to generalize the new measures and not to allow them to be employed for longer than necessary.

With this spirit and self confidence we must enter upon the new phase, which must embody our ambitions and aspirations as Ba'thists and fighters for unity, freedom and socialism.

1) The Party's Leadership of the Revolution and its Political Power, and Confrontation of Imperialist and Reactionary Plots .

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party was able during the past phase to consolidate revolutionary authority and its leadership as well as widen the national base of government. It was able to foil all plots, imperialist or reactionary. But we must not be tempted to rest on our laurels, in thinking that all is over and we face no more threats.

Conditions in the area are deteriorating in such a way that our Revolution poses a great danger to the receding interests of the imperialists. Iraq is becoming a revolutionary island surrounded by a sea of imperialist and reactionary influence. The new phase will witness an intensification of the battle against the Party, the Revolution and the gains of the people. The enemy will use new weapons against us and will put onto the battle-field reserves hitherto unused. They have, in fact, started.

We must not of course lose sight of the possibility of changes in favour of the Arab liberation

movement. For the area we live in is full of forces, variables and unpredictables. But we must be prepared for the worst as we were in the battle for nationalization, which we won.

This realistic and revolutionary estimate is the key to victory. The leadership must consider the new circumstances and prepare the ways and means to respond. We know full well that all forces of connivance and conspiracy cannot overcome our people, Revolution and Party, as long as we know how to use our united national resources, where to hit, when to advance and when to retreat, in a disciplined fashion in order to attack again.

We must remember that:

First: Preservation of the Revolution is the number one priority and is the duty of the Party, the progressive front and all fighters for freedom, unity and progress together with all honourable men in the Arab Nation. The Revolutionary base which has been established in this part of the Arab World must be preserved at all costs.

Second: That the resolute, brave and intelligent method used by the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the leadership of the Revolution in facing the conspiracies and conspirators of all shades and identities is necessary and must be

maintained.

Third: The coming phase must witness swifter and more decisive measures to purge the government machinery of all conspiratorial and suspect elements. The task must be achieved quickly and surgically.

Fourth: The effective leadership of the Party for the state and society is a top priority and must never be neglected. It is not only necessary for the Party, but also for the nation.

In this respect, two points must be stressed:

A — The leadership of the Party cannot be measured by size, number or form, but by the real success of the Party in mobilizing the masses and setting the state in the direction of the basic principles of the Revolution, and by the real persuasion of the masses that the Party is needed to lead the people and the country.

1 — There will never be any retreat from the March Declaration on the Kurdish Question. The Declaration, with all of its articles and documents as expressed by the leaders of the Party and national front, is a definite ideological and practical commitment to our Kurdish and Arab people in Iraq and the Arab Nation. Regardless of the stance of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, no violation of the Declaration will be allowed.

The Declaration, however, does not constitute a commitment towards the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. The range of cooperation with the Kurdistan Party will be commensurate with its readiness to apply the Declaration in creating an autonomy within the framework of national unity and cooperation with Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the National Front. No effort should be spared to bring closer the points of view and effect greater cooperation and within the framework of the National Front to put the March Declaration and self-rule in Kurdistan into effect.

2 — The peaceful democratic solution of the Kurdish Question adopted by the Party and the National Front is the correct solution theoretically, practically and politically and it must be a permanent commitment. This does not mean that we should not resist suspect attempts encouraged by the imperialist and reactionary circles in the Kurdish area to break the national unity and encourage the permanence of abnormality to institute separation. The Party, Revolution and forces of the Front must be vigilant against such plans where by the imperialists try to exploit abnormal conditions, coining slogans, and formulate a reactionary alliance under the guise of caring for the national rights of the Kurds. For the



real motivation of the imperialists is to hit at the Revolution and the revolutionary democratic and progressive gains of the whole Iraqi people.

D — The Progressive Front.

The past phase was one of preparation for the establishment of the Progressive Front. On July 17th 1973, after five years of the Revolution, the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party was able to reach agreement with the Iraqi Communist Party on common terms for a national pact for action and the rules of the Front. A higher committee from both parties and a secretariat were formed.

During the next five years, we are expected to achieve two tasks on the Front:

A — We must complete the building of the Front by adding the other parties defined by the pact. They are the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the nationalists and the independents.

We must also establish the Front's institutions as defined by the pact.

B — We must preserve the Front with care and make it a success and lead it correctly in all fields.

It shall be a central task for the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party to consolidate the front and strengthen its practices and traditions by creative leadership. All Party fighters, particularly those entrusted with Front work must bear their responsibilities.

The Front line of work occupies a central position in the national struggle against imperialism, Zionism and the reactionnaires in the whole Arab Homeland. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party is historically responsible for making this line succeed through setting the right example in Iraq and through revolutionary activity throughout the Homeland.

E — Democratic Transformations:

The main task that is awaiting us in the field of democratic transformation is the fulfilment of the prerequisites and institutions of «popular democracy». This will be guided by the following pointers:

1 — To form the National Assembly in its transitional stage.

2 — To formulate the theoretical, political and legislative prerequisites of the people's councils and provide them with experienced cadres for leadership. They must be given all the care and attention needed as a new institution of the revolutionary society and a bulwark of the popular democracy experiment.

3 — The role of Party and official press and popular organizations must be further expanded. Criticism, dialogues and discussions on fundamental issues and issues of public interest must be encouraged. Every means must be used to expand

the base of participation by the masses by discussing their problems and finding the proper solution for them.

4 — Within the next phase with the maturing of the popular democracy's experiment, it must be completed by a standing constitution for the country. General elections for the National Assembly must be held as well as for the people's councils.

The next phase requires intensive intellectual activity to find the formulae and solutions for the issue of the prerequisites of popular democracy. This will not be easy especially in a country like ours where a tradition of democracy does not exist. We shall face many difficult problems to which we shall be expected to provide the proper interpretation and solutions. We must not however be afraid of failure because this is the only way to find the right answers and discover errors. We must deal with failures in a realistic, revolutionary way which may produce emergency formulae which at the same time do not lose sight of the strategic horizon and aim, which is the building of a popular democracy.

In the course of building the popular democracy, we must maintain a delicate balance. No rash steps must be taken before the formulation of the objective prerequisites.

On the other hand, we must not exaggerate

difficulties and errors which would cause us to hesitate in our progress towards building the components of popular democracy.

It must be emphasized that the crisis of democracy is one of the most dangerous crises of the Arab revolutionary movement and the Arab conditions as a whole. To realize success in an experiment in popular democracy will make our experiment an inspiration and a shining example for the Arab revolutionary movement.

### 3 — The Tasks of Socialist Transformation.

In this report, we mentioned earlier that the tasks faced by the July 17th Revolution in socialist transformation were threefold: (1) Reformation in agriculture, industry, commerce and services to wipe out the prevailing chaos. (2) Initiation of large scale and comprehensive development. (3) Initiation of measures and changes directly related to the task of socialist transformation.

These three aspects that marked the past phase will also mark the coming one over the next five years, when we shall enter upon the task of socialist application in fields sufficiently mature. Many significant reforms in agriculture, industry, commerce and services have been achieved over the past five years. But these changes still suffer from lack of coordination and insufficient

planning. Reform in these fields in the next five years will be marked by "socialist necessity".

It will not be possible to take more socialist steps if the problems created by reform have not been solved. A high standard of efficiency and technical resources in the public sector is required in order to go forward in depth.

The question of development was and will be for a long time to come a basic and very serious task. During the next five years, development formulae will serve socialist transformation. They will be used to serve, develop and expand the socialist sector in agriculture, industry, commerce and services. Special attention will be given to the improvement of living standards.

In addition to these two aspects of securing the preliminary steps towards socialist transformation, we shall be expected in the latter stages of the next five years to move into socialism in every field where the objective conditions are sufficiently mature to allow such a transition. In this respect , the following main tasks are awaiting us:

1 — Expansion of the socialist sector in agriculture (state farms, collectives and cooperatives). It must be developed, so as to become the prevailing and leading sector. Individualistic forms of agriculture must be discouraged in order to

increase production, accelerate socialist transformation and raise the standard of living for the farmers.

2 — All foreign trade must come under the state, while in internal trade, the public sector must prevail. Due consideration will be given the urgent requirements of the development plan which might necessitate some exceptions.

3 — Strengthening of the prominence of the public sector in industry. We must work to move away from state capitalism in this sector to a socialist democracy. The private sector in industry will have to be further coordinated so that it can play its role in the development plan.

4 — Public services will have to be directed in accordance with the requirements of development and socialist transformation.

The question of economic competition in the area must be taken into consideration in all matters relating to socialist transformation. Iraq is surrounded by a rich capitalistic and imperialist sphere of influence. American imperialism will try to make these states appear better examples of development.

They will try to exploit to the utmost any error in our socialist transformation to weaken confidence in our system. The standard of living and provision of consumer goods will play a

leading role in the battle between the two competitive systems.

Together with our insistence on socialism, its development and the in-depth socialist education of the masses to unmask the deceptions of the counter propaganda, it will be necessary to take the above matters into consideration by calculating carefully every step towards socialism. Flexibility will be required in facing emergency situations and difficult circumstances. But care must be taken that in the end everything will lead to the socialist method .

In the context of the three steps to socialism and the four tasks ahead which are mentioned above, it would be advisable to consider the following pointers:

1 — The essential aim of socialism is to wipe out exploitation, realize social justice and secure welfare in all fields within the framework of available resources and national interests. Increased production is basic to the realization of social welfare. It is therefore necessary that socialist transformation should be directly connected with the increase in production and the achievement of a welfare state.

2 — A great leap is now required in the standard of living by increasing salaries and wages. This is justified by the big increase in our national

income under the Revolution of July 17th and particularly our triumph in the battle for nationalization. Taxes must be reduced and some of them cancelled; costs of basic services such as electricity and water must be reduced. Education must be completely free, better health services and more housing must be provided. Such measures must be taken with attention at the same time to fixing the prices of goods at acceptable levels for the majority.

3 — Complete and accurate coordination between agriculture and industry on the one hand and commerce on the other is very important. For in the light of this, many things will be decided such as external and internal commerce on a socialist basis so that the needs of the masses will be secured in a regular manner. Successful coordination will eliminate propaganda against socialism. It will also solve the basic question of industry which is the provision of raw materials. With coordination, the bulk of raw materials can be supplied locally while the rest can be imported regularly and in accordance with a correct long-range and stable plan.

A comprehensive reappraisal is needed of all economic institutions which have any relation with planning or execution, in order to establish a central authority of short, medium and long



term planning and coordination with socialism as the final objective.

4 — The principles of the Revolution aim at the complete transformation of society in the context of playing a pioneering role on the national level in the struggle to achieve Arab unity, freedom and socialism in addition to our large income from oil resulting from our triumph in the battle for nationalization, urges us to achieve growth in an explosive way, to secure rapid development in all fields throughout Iraq. This requires a change in formulae and in old traditional and inefficient ways. Many laws must be reviewed. Arab and international expertise must be enlisted so that we can complete the development programmes in a much shorter time.

The next five years must constitute the great leap in economic and social fields. We must be able to move into an advanced position in which a strong and progressive national economy will be firmly established. In all this, we must be able to give a good example as opposed to the distorted example of the sick capitalistic regimes in the area. Their ways lead them to inevitable failure as has been proved time and again in the Third World.

5 — The nature of the battle over the next

five years requires wide and intensive educational and informational activity among the masses. The need will arise more than ever before for the socialist information and socialist culture to confront imperialist and reactionary propaganda and to win the support of the people for the socialist way.

#### **4 — THE ARMED FORCES**

The two main tasks that faced the Revolution concerning the armed forces still occupy priority above all else:

1 — Consolidation of the Party's leadership of the army, spreading the Party's national and socialist principles and precepts which enable the army to perform its duty immune from deviation and to identify with the popular movement under the leadership of the Party and the active participation of the army in revolutionary construction and carrying out national duties.

The armed forces are required to maintain most of the emergency measures which secure the Party's supervision. Some regulation may be dropped or improved, but the necessity remains, during the coming phase, for developing and improving the emergency regulations that keep the army under the Party's complete control.

2 — Reorganization of the army on modern

lines, development of its training and mobilization methods and its fighting capabilities, expanding its formations and supplying it with the best possible way to safeguard the unity of the country and deter any imperialist Zionist aggression.

The important role played by our army in the October War of 1973 was a big surprise to many. This imposes on us a big responsibility to keep our armed forces up to standard, in view of the enemies' new knowledge of our strength. We must make an exceptional effort to keep our army up to the standard of any confrontation and confident of victory,.

As for the rest of the armed forces, the security forces; the police and the frontier guards, the next five years will require similar measures to tighten the control of the Party over them. Special emphasis must be put on modernizing the police force to make it a machine at the service of the people in all districts of Iraq.

## **SOCIAL AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION**

The importance of the dialectical relationship between social and cultural transformation on the one hand and socialist democratic trans-

formations cannot be overstressed. Both should go hand in hand.

To the past phase, the social and cultural transformation lagged behind the democratic and socialist transformation in size and velocity. More revolutionary effort is needed to put both on a par. There have been some difficulties in the past, but the next five years will definitely provide better circumstances to meet the Party's ambitions.

We must benefit from the experience of the past five years. The path will not be clear of obstacles, even crises. This field directly affects the minds and habits of the people. It is also the field of confrontation with the forces of backwardness and regression. We must, however, go forward and achieve our aims in this field on the basis of making provision for all hinderances.

#### A — The State Machine

A new extensive effort must be made to build the modern revolutionary state. The Revolution cannot go forward and strengthen its ties with the masses, while the government machinery is still out of date and incapable of understanding the significance of the revolutionary transformation or responding to it. The state administration must be lifted from bureaucracy and negligence, and infused with qualified personnel.

In building the state administration, we must pay attention to the human element as well as the means. The leading elements in the administration must be selected from those who are loyal to the Revolution and capable of putting its programmes into application efficiently. We must get rid of the old standards in selecting the state officials. Some of the state's systems which are out of date must be liquidated completely. An administration is needed that is in line with the spirit and requirements of modern times.

### **3 — Culture and Information**

The sick phenomena in this field which appeared during the past phase must be liquidated completely.

Bureaucracy, lack of enthusiasm and lack of initiative were prevalent. This must be ended and a new really vanguard sector must replace it.

The new phase must witness the real birth of the revolutionary information media. The time has come for the Revolution to possess an inspiring information media not only for Iraq but also for the Arab Nation.

In addition to the necessity of a good informational and cultural system in itself, the coming phase will witness a confrontation with imperia-

lism and reaction in which the informational media will have to play a leading role in deterring the oncoming offensive. As we have to face the enemies in all other fields, so we have to face them also in the field of information.

We shall have to pay great attention to the cadre of the information system and build it on a sound basis. The democratic and inventive spirit will have to be diffused. Personnel will have to be appraised objectively and given the chance to advance according to ability. Bureaucracy and horizontal expansion in this sector are meaningless. The phase requires the attraction of a maximum number of writers, artists, intellectuals and information men loyal to the Revolution. Arab experts and qualified personnel must be attracted to assist in this field.

### **C — Education**

The next five years must focus comprehensively on the building of an education system in harmony with the principles and aims of the Revolution. A system that rears generations infused with the ideals of national and socialist democracy and capable of realizing the ambitions of the Party. Time will not be on the side of the Revolution if we maintain the pace in education of the last five years.

New educational programmes must be in-

troduced starting from programmes for the kindergarten up the university level: programmes based on the principles of the Party and the Revolution and their regional and national objectives. This will require a purge of our existing programmes of all bourgeois, liberal and reactionary trends. The new generation must be immunized against all trends of thought that are not in harmony with the ambitions of our Arab nation and its basic aims: unity, freedom and socialism.

The new phase requires a reappraisal of the whole education system with the idea of rebuilding it on lines compatible with the objectives of the Revolution. What is needed in particular is a special stress on science and technology in education, in order to provide the Revolution with personnel required in the various fields of development.

The universities will become centres for the new generation to carry out research and planning, and contribute effectively to the revolutionary transformation, instead of being just mere centres bestowing certificates of graduation.

## **D — Legislation**

The natural thing to do after the rise of the Revolution, in expressing the interests of the

working classes, was to overhaul the existing laws and change, modify and annul whatever was required in the interests of socialism. This task was not performed during the past phase. The major changes that took place in this respect were on the initiative of the leadership of the Party and the Revolution.

The gap must be bridged during the next phase so that the laws of society will introduce a balance and will express the interests of the classes on whose behalf the Revolution took place.

A point must be kept in mind. Our criticism of the bulk of our laws for their backwardness does not justify their contravention. The correct way would be through scientific studies and the proper channels of the Revolution and in a way consonant with the progress of the revolution.

### **E — Women**

The past phase did not witness enough ideological and practical effort to liberate women legal status of men and women. We must struggle to which prevent their contributing effectively to society as called for by the Party. The coming phase must of necessity promote such an effort.

We must work towards equal educational and work opportunities for women and equal legal status of men and women. We must struggle to unmask the backward and reactionary trends



of thought which consider women inferior. We must put an end to practices emanating from such backward attitudes. The pace of women's liberation must be accelerated so that women would occupy their proper place in society.

While we are struggling to liberate society as a whole, including women, we must make sure not to take rash steps and irrational decisions, and thus play into the hands of the reactionaries, providing ready-made justifications for counter-revolutionary moves. At the same time, we warn against fear of reactionaries and allowing fear to block our progress in drawing up a programme for women's liberation.

## **F -- Adult Education**

Although extensive efforts were made during the past phase to eradicate illiteracy, they did not wholly fulfil their objective . The coming phase must witness a reappraisal of the means used so that we can make the transition from the phase of reducing illiteracy to the phase of its complete eradication. The past experiment has proved the inability of the classical method to wipe out illiteracy in the underdeveloped countries.

Eradication of illiteracy requires a major campaign to be led by the Party, with the par-

ticipation of popular organizations, the armed forces, competent government systems and all the forces available. A time limit must be set for reaching the target, while all the material resources required must be made available.

The next five years must witness the application of compulsory elementary education throughout Iraq to be followed later by compulsory education in the higher stages.

### **G — Youth**

Youth organization is still in its first stages. What has been achieved so far is not equal to the ambition of the Party or to the needs of the new phase and the grave challenges ahead.

The new phase demands that the Party launch an intensive and persistent campaign to make the infant youth organization an effective popular movement wide enough to include the largest number of young men and women in Iraq, and able to contribute to the diffusion of socialist principles and practices. Youth must be enlisted on a broad scale to build socialism, defend the country and carry out national tasks.

The chances missed during the past phase must be regained during the coming phase through exceptional efforts.

### **H — New Values and Practices in the Revolutionary Society.**

The comprehensive programmes of revolutionary transformation for the next phase, in all fields, require a continued struggle with a high degree of resolution to spread the patriotic and national values and the tenets of courage, sacrifice, responsibility, love of labour and the uprooting of worn-out values and practices which we have inherited from the days of domination and backwardness.

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, its fighters and leaders have basic responsibilities in this respect, in the example they set for others and the spirit they show in their work. The popular organizations and their leaders are similarly responsible.

Popular work is a tool in spreading the new values. The labour squads achieved significant success during the past phase in disseminating the new values.

In order to achieve their objectives, formulae for such work must take the form of planned and continuous initiatives.

Military training for the masses plays a special role in this. It must therefore be expanded to include the greatest possible number of people, organized forces and particularly young people. Training in the use of arms must be one of the main prerequisites in building the new man in the new

society. It also provides the country with a reserve army in addition to the national army which may play an effective role in protecting the Revolution and the country, and in carrying national missions.

The next phase must be characterized by a clear programme encouraging individual and group initiative with material and moral incentives. We must prepare ourselves for the widespread of new values and practices of the coming phase.

Our great people.

The Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party places in your hands this report which contains a serious and sincere study of the experiment of the phase from the rise of the Revolution until the date of convocation of the congress. It also contains a revolutionary programme for the next five years until the holding of the Ninth Regional Congress.

Your Party, the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, which rose from your ranks and has fought for many years, making sacrifices and expressing your aspirations and interests, promises you to continue fighting with your help and confidence, and to remain faithful to its ideals and loyal to the people and their objectives.

Let this programme be a guide to us all during the coming phase. Let us mobilize all our forces

with the utmost enthusiasm and with determination and selflessness, so that it can be applied; so that progressive and democratic transformations be achieved. Let us build a progressive society and strengthen our revolutionary base in this part of the Arab Homeland so that it can always remain a focal point and a base of support for the Arab masses and the Arab revolutionary movement everywhere, under the banners of unity, freedom and socialism.